


VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

GO WORLD

Winter 2003 - 04 NO. 100



KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

Original Japanese Woodblock Prints

Original Japanese wooden block prints (*ukiyo-e*) on go themes by great Japanese artist are available for sale by Mita Arts Gallery. All prints are accompanied with a Letter of Authenticity. Mita Arts is a specialist in Japanese prints and is now celebrating its 40th anniversary. The print below is currently being offered for sale.

Title: The Ground Spider Manifesting Demons in the Mansion of Prince Minamoto no Yorimitsu

Artist: Kuniyoshi Utagawa

Format: Oban triptych

Condition: Good impression and color; full size; some restorations along the borders.

Publisher: Ibaya Senzaburo

Date: 1843



Price: ¥400,000

This print, one of Kuniyoshi's most original and powerful designs, was taken by the authorities as a satire against the government and created a lot of trouble. There is little doubt that Kuniyoshi indeed intended it as a protest against the rigid oppressions that the ruling Shogunate was enforcing upon the hapless middle and lower classes. In this light the Ground Spider and his demons are to be seen as representing the spirit of popular revolt, while the sick Raiko is the ineffectual Shogun, and the warriors represent hard-hearted ministers and the Chief Censor. The print was seized and the blocks destroyed; as a consequence an impression of the original is very rare. It was issued at least twice more by pirate publishers working from recut blocks. For the Raiko-Tsuchigumo story, see <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/raiko.html> and *Go World* #62.

MITA ARTS GALLERY

IVY building, 4th Floor

1-10-1 Jimbocho, Kanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan 101-0051

TEL. +81-3-3294-4554; FAX +81-3-3294-4556

email: sachie@mita-arts.com; <http://www.mita-arts.com>

Contents

Go World Turns 100	2
Go World News	3
GoGoD Quiz	12
The 58th Honinbo Title Match: Kato Masao vs. Cho U	14
Game One: Cho self-destructs	14
Game Two: Obstinacy a pitfall	23
Game Three: The old Kato is back	27
Game Four: Focus on a cutting point	32
Game Five: An unwinnable ko	39
Game Six: An upset secures the title	44
The 28th Meijin Title Match: Yoda Norimoto vs. Yamashita Keigo	52
Game One: Outmanoeuvred in the centre	52
The 9th Women's Kusu Title, Game Two	57
The 10th King of the New Stars: Kong vs. Hu	59
Go Seigen's Triple Attack	61
The Top Ten Tesujis	65
Most Captures in One Game	72
Original Moves	75
The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (4)	86

The cover: Two lovers with a shamisen. A chuban print by Harunobu. The scene in this print probably takes place in the apartment of a courtesan. In order to entertain her customers, it was important for her to be adept at the arts known as the "Four Accomplishments" (*kinky shoga*), namely, music, go, calligraphy, and painting. On hand for these purposes we can see in this print the shamisen the courtesan is holding and a koto standing in the upper right. Beside it is a go board, as well as a shogi board. Calligraphy is represented by the writing just below the pillow and painting by the picture on the screen at the back. An essay on the "Four Accomplishments" can be found at <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/four.html>. (From the collection of Erwin Gerstorfer)

Go World is published by Kiseido Publishing Company, CPO Box 1140, Tokyo, Japan.
Visit Kiseido's web site at: <http://www.kiseido.com/> Guest editor: John Power

North American subscribers, order from:
Kiseido, 2255 — 29th St., Suite 4, Santa
Monica, CA 90405; Tel: 1-800-988-6463;
FAX: 1-310-578-7381;
e-mail: sales@kiseido.com
Price: US\$32 per year; back issues: US\$9

European subscribers, order from:
Schaak en Gowinkel het Paard
Haarlemmerdijk 147
1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland
Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885
Price: Euro 7,25 per issue

Play go on the Internet on the Kiseido Go Server: <http://kgs.kiseido.com/>

A complete index of *Go World* is available at: <http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~kiseido/GWINDEX/gwi.html>

GO WORLD (ISSN 0286-0376) is published quarterly for \$28.00 per year by Kiseido, 2255 — 29th St., Suite 4, Santa Monica, CA 90405. Periodical postage paid at Santa Monica, CA. POSTMASTER: Send change of address orders to GO WORLD, c/o Kiseido, 2255—29th St., Suite 4, Santa Monica, CA 90405. Printed in Japan. © Copyright 2004 by Kiseido Publishing Company (ISSN 0286-0376). All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher. *Note:* Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names. The McCune-Reischauer romanization system is used for Korean names.

Go World turns 100

This is the 100th issue of *Go World* and to commemorate it we are publishing a special issue of 100 pages, with the editor of the first 71 issues, John Power, returning as guest editor. We hope that our readers enjoy it.

When we founded this magazine in 1977, we weren't thinking very far ahead into the future, and we certainly wouldn't have bet anything on our still being around 100 issues later. In those pre-electronic-media days, when the magazine was typeset manually, we were completely pre-occupied with the battle to get out the next issue. Actually, that hasn't really changed. Perhaps the biggest difference is that, now that typesetting is a desktop operation, we can't blame anyone else for our typos.

As the years passed, the magazine gradually changed. When we started off, we saw our main role as presenting Japanese professional go to the Western world. Little did we foresee the shift in the balance of power in the go world — nudged a little in China's direction in the 80s, then swung radically towards Korea in the 90s. Nowadays in the magazine we try to cover the international scene as much as possible, but, as this issue shows, our linguistic limitations keep the main focus on the Japanese go scene. We can claim, however, that over the last decade we have presented quite a few articles covering Korean go.

We hope to stick around for the next 100 issues, and we look forward to the continuing support of our readers, without whom, of course, this magazine would not exist. We would like to thank you for the patronage and loyalty that have sustained the first 100 issues.

Richard Bozulich
Publisher of *Go World*
January 31, 2004

Go World Index

The online *Go World Index* was conceived by Jochen Fassbender as a service for our readers to commemorate the publication of our first 100 issues (though it was actually uploaded a couple of issues ago). It now covers nearly 6,600 pages (including this issue). We would like to thank Jochen for his remarkable generosity and dedication in compiling the index (he also offers invaluable assistance with proofreading). We hope that our readers find the index of use and that it adds to the enjoyment of reading the magazine.

We would like to take this opportunity to mention a new feature of the index. There is a link called 'Broad terms' on the GWI main page leading to a page where the following 12 (hierarchically) broad terms are listed:

- Go
- Players
- Games
- Tournaments
- Fuseki
- Joseki
- Middle game
- Endgame
- Shape and technique
- Life and death
- Problems
- Statistics

The above available index terms represent broad concepts and provide a hierarchical top-down approach to finding specific information. Most of these terms show cross-references to narrower terms (often grouped according to context).

The index can be viewed at:

<http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~kiseido/GWINDEX/gwi.html>

Go World News

November 2003~January 2004

by John Power

International



Cho Chikun wins 8th Samsung Cup

For the first time in three and a half years, since O Rissei won the Chunlan title in June 2000, a Japanese representative has won an international title, the 8th Samsung Cup. The successful player is Cho Chikun, who, like O, is actually one of the overseas members of the Nihon Ki-in. Surprisingly, considering his domination of the Japanese title scene for much of the last two decades of the 20th century, this was only his second world title. (Cho won the 4th Fujitsu Cup in 1991; besides that, he has appeared in just one final, in the 4th Tong Yang Securities Cup in 1992).

Cho expressed his admiration for his opponent, the 18-year-old Pak Yeong-hun, one of the new stars of Korean go, in the victory interview. The reason was the great composure shown by Pak after the deciding game. Pak had had a comfortable lead, but made a fatal slip late in the end-game that let Cho pull off something inside his territory. Cho commented that he would have been tearing his hair if he had thrown away a win in this fashion, whereas Pak concealed his disappointment and calmly reviewed the game with Cho.

Cho actually participated in this tournament by special invitation from the sponsor — as he doesn't hold a Japanese title, he would not normally get one of the seeded places. He com-

mented that he agonized about accepting the invitation and that he would have preferred to win when he held a big-three Japanese title. Perhaps the lack of pressure now that he has no titles made things easier for him.

Semifinals (Taegu, Korea)

(4 Nov.) Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) d. Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) by resig.; Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan (Korea) (W) d. Xie He 5-dan (China) by 3½.

(5 Nov.) Cho (B) d. Hu by ½; Pak (B) d. Xie by ½.

Final (Taegu)

Game 1 (8 Dec.). Pak (W) by 4½.

Game 2 (9 Dec.). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 3 (11 Dec.). Cho (W) by resig.

8th LG Cup: Koreans monopolize semifinal places

This tournament slipped through our net in GW99. The opening rounds were played in Seoul in mid-June and were notable for an upset to rival Hans Pietsch's win against Yoda Norimoto, who was then Gosei, in the second term of the same tournament (see GW81). This time the upset went to Alexandr Dinerchtein of Russia, who defeated O Rissei Judan in the first round. Alexandr is a professional 1-dan at the Korean Ki-in.

Michael Redmond 9-dan, representing North America, also won his game in the first round, defeating O Meien 9-dan, so it was a good day for Western go. Unfortunately, they were both eliminated in the second round.

No Japanese player survived the second round either. Korea took six of the quarterfinal places and China the other two, but the semifinalists are all Korean.

Round 1 (Seoul, 17 June)

Mok Chin-seok 6-dan (Korea) (W) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (W) b. Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Chinese Taipei) by 5½; Alexandr Dinerchtein 1-dan (Europe) (W) b. O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) by 1½; Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) b. An Cho-yeong 7-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (B) b. Hong Chang-sik 4-dan (Korea) by resig.; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (W) b. An Yeong-kil 5-dan (Korea) by resig.; Michael Redmond 9-dan (North

America) (W) b. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Kim Chu-ho 3-dan (Korea) (W) b. Ryu Shikun 9-dan (Japan) by 2½.

Round 2 (Seoul, 19 June)

Yi Se-tol 7-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yu Bin by resig.; Chang Hao (W) b. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) by 5½; Wang Lei (B) b. Song T'ae-kon 4-dan (Korea) by ½; Kim Chu-ho (B) b. Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by resig.; Mok (B) b. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Cho Chikun by resig.; Cho Han-seung 6-dan (Korea) (W) b. Dinerchtein by resig.; Weon Seong-chin 5-dan (Korea) (B) b. Redmond by resig.

Quarterfinals (Shanghai, 28 October)

Yi Ch'ang-ho (B) b. Kim by resig.; Cho Han-seung (W) b. Yi Se-tol by resig.; Weon (B) b. Chang Hao by resig.; Mok (W) b. Wang by resig.

Semifinals (3 February)

Yi vs. Weon; Mok vs. Cho.

Pak wins 2nd Cheongkwangjang Cup

Pak Chi-eun 4-dan has come into her own, scoring a big success just after turning 20. In the 2nd Cheongkwangjang Cup, an international women's championship, she defeated Rui Naiwei, long established as the world's top woman player, in the semifinal, played soon after her birthday on 4 November. In the final, held early in the new year, she defeated her compatriot Yun Yeong-seon 2-0 to win her first international title.

Pak's triumph is yet more confirmation of the dramatic rise in the level of women's go in Korea over the last half-decade.

Semifinals (Seoul)

(24 Nov.). Pak Chi-eun 4-dan (Korea) (B) b. Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yun Yeong-seon 2-dan (Korea) (B) b. Yi Yeong-sin 2-dan (Korea) by resig.

(25 Nov.). Rui (B) b. Pak by resig.; Yun (W) b. Yi by ½.

(27 Nov.). Pak (W) b. Rui by resig.

Final (Shanghai)

Game 1 (5 Jan.). Pak (W) by 3½.

Game 2 (7 Jan.). Pak (B) by 1½.

Korea makes a recovery in 5th Nong Shim Cup

Kobayashi Koichi followed up Cho U's excellent start for Japan by winning three games in a row in the second round of the 5th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup, held in Pusan. Kobayashi defeated two Chinese players and, between them,

Pak Chi-eun 4-dan, the first woman to play in this team tournament. After seven games, Japan had a big lead, with five wins to one loss, and Korea was staring disaster in the face.

At this point, the 18-year-old Weon Seong-chin came to Korea's rescue, stopping Kobayashi's run and following up with two more wins to take Korea to an even 3-3 score. Now it is China, on 2-4, which is under the most pressure.

The final round will be held in Shanghai in February.

The Pusan round

Game 5 (12 Nov.). Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (Japan) (B) beat Wang Lei 8-dan (China) by 1½.

Game 6 (13 Nov.). Kobayashi (B) beat Pak Chi-eun 4-dan (Korea) by 7½ points.

Game 7 (14 Nov.). Kobayashi (W) beat Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by resig.

Game 8 (15 Nov.). Weon Seong-chin 5-dan (Korea) (B) beat Kobayashi by 3½ points.

Game 9 (16 Nov.). Weon (W) beat Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) by 4½ points.

Game 10 (17 Nov.). Weon (W) beat Ryu Shikun 9-dan (Japan) by resig.

China dominates 5th Chunlan Cup

One of China's greatest go ambitions is to win its own international tournament, the Chunlan Cup. The best it has done so far is to secure second place in the 2nd cup.

China's turn may have come at last, as its players dominated the opening rounds of the 5th Cup, securing six of the quarterfinal places. The ominous note is that one of the remaining two places went to Yi Ch'ang-ho, who, despite the rise of younger Korean players, can still claim, with three current international titles to his name, to be the world's number one. The final place went to Cho U, representing Japan.

Round 1 (29 December, Beijing)

Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) beat Kong Jie 7-dan (China) by resig.; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Peng Jinghua 6-dan (Chinese Taipei) by resig.; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (B) b. Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Song T'ae-kon 6-dan (Korea) (W) b. O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) by 11½; Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (B) b. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Peng Quan 5-dan (China) (B) b. Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Ch. Taipei) by 4½; Gu Li 7-dan (China) (B) b. Michael Redmond 9-dan (USA) by resig.; Hu Yaoyu 7-dan (China) (B) b. Guo Juan 5-dan (Europe) by resig.

Round 2 (31 December, Beijing)

Gu Li (W) b. Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan) by resig.;

Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (B) b. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yu Bin by 6½; Wang (W) b. Song by ½; Peng (W) b. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok by 2½; Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (W) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by 3½; Cho U 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Luo Xihe 9-dan (China) by resig.; Hu (W) b. Cho Chikun by resig.

The quarterfinals are scheduled to be played in September 2004. Pairings are:

Chang Hao vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho; Hu Yaoyu vs. Cho U; Zhou Heyang vs. Gu Li; Wang Lei vs. Peng Quan.

Current international champions

4th Ing Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
1st Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
16th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
8th Samsung Cup: Cho Chikun (Japan)
4th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
7th LG Cup: Yi Se-tol
15th TV Asia Cup: Zhou Heyang (China)
2nd Cheongkwanjang Cup: Pak Chi-eun (Korea)
4th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Korea
2nd CSK Cup: Japan

Most world championships won

18: Yi Ch'ang-ho
11: Cho Hun-hyeon
6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok
4: Yoda Norimoto
3: Yi Se-tol
2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, Yu Bin, O Rissei, Cho Chikun
1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho, Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang

(By country) Korea: 39; Japan: 18;
China: 5

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 10 Japan: 1

Korea wins Pair Go

The 14th International Amateur Pair Go Championship was held in Tokyo on 15 and 16 November. The Korean pair of Kim Se-young and Kim Nam-hoon (not related) won all five games and scored Korea's second success in this tournament.

The top Western pair was the father-and-

daughter team of Tibor and Rita Pocsai of Hungary, who took 4th place.



The two Kims secure Korea's second victory in the Pair Go championship.

News from Japan

Cho U wins 51st Oza title

Cho U failed to take the Honinbo title off O Meien two years ago, but he had better luck when he challenged O for the Oza title. The defending champion won the first game, but Cho bounced back to win the next three and take the title.

The number of titleholders is steadily growing smaller. Earlier in 2003, the top seven titles were distributed among seven players, which is actually a little unusual; with Cho joining Yoda as a dual titleholder, that number is now down to five. Incidentally, six of the challenges for top-seven titles last year were made by players in their 20s, and four of them are now held by three players in their 20s, so 2003 can be regarded as the year in which the generational changeover was really put into effect.

The results:

Game 1 (30 Oct.). O (B) by resig.
Game 2 (6 Nov.). Cho (B) by resig.
Game 3 (27 Nov.). Cho (W) by resig.
Game 4 (4 Dec.). Cho (B) by ½.




O Meien plays the first move in the third game of the Oza title match.

Hane defends Tengen title

The odds looked very tough for Hane Naoki when Yamashita Keigo Kisei became the challenger for the 29th Tengen title: the latter had an overwhelming lead over him of 8-2, which included two successive wipeouts in the Shinjin-O (King of the New Stars) title in 1999 and 2000.

When Hane lost the first game, many go fans probably wrote him off. If they did, they were premature. Hane fought back very strongly to take the second and third games with convincing wins. Yamashita survived the kadoban in the fourth, but Hane again outfought him in the final game.



Hane (left) takes the lead in the third game of the Tengen title match.



Kobayashi Izumi, Women's Honinbo, with Cho U, then her fiancé, shortly after defending her title.

Hane is known for his good positional judgement and overall balance, but in this series he seemed determined to take the fight to the opponent. His strategy succeeded, and he won this title for the third year in a row. His victory is a very good omen for his upcoming Kisei challenge.

The results:

- Game 1 (30 Oct.). Yamashita (B) by 1½.
- Game 2 (20 Nov.). Hane (B) by 4½.
- Game 3 (27 Nov.). Hane (W) by resig.
- Game 4 (4 Dec.). Yamashita (W) by resig.
- Game 5 (18 Dec.). Hane (W) by 6½.

Hane Naoki leads in Kisei

The Kisei title match now in progress pits the top two players of the younger generation against each other. The challenger is Hane Naoki 9-dan, who is playing his second title match in a row against Yamashita Keigo Kisei. Hane had previously done quite badly against Yamashita, but he improved his record from 2-8 to a more respectable 5-10 in the course of winning the Tengen title match. This was his first title-match victory over Yamashita and should have boosted his confidence just in time for his debut in two-day games in the Kisei title match.

After winning the Kisei A League 5-0, Hane defeated the winner of the B League, Cho Chikun, 25th Honinbo, in the play-off, held on 13 November. Hane took a small lead after coming up with a new move in the opening and held on to it throughout the game, eventually winning by 2½ points.

Hane has made a great start to the title match, winning the first game, held in Seattle on 15 and 16 January, with black and the second, played in Fukuoka on 28 and 29 January, both by resignation.

Kobayashi defends Women's Honinbo, wins JAL Women's Lightning Go

Kobayashi Izumi made a bad start to her defence in the 22nd Women's Honinbo title match, losing the opening game to the challenger, Yashiro Kumiko 5-dan. Yashiro has been one of the top women players recently, but this was her title-match debut. Her win was her fourth in a row against Kobayashi, so at this point her chances of taking the title looked good. However, Kobayashi then hit form and reeled off three successive wins to defend her title.

Kobayashi has now won the Women's Honinbo for three years in a row. Her good form continued in the final of the 1st JAL Women's

59th Honinbo league (2 October 2003 to April 2004) Title-holder: Cho U

Rank	Player/opponent	KM	OM	YK	KK	YN	OR	CS	MT	Score
1	Kato Masao	—	0			0	0		1	1 – 3
2	O Meien	1	—	0	0			0		1 – 3
3	Yamashita Keigo		1	—	0	0		0		1 – 3
4	Kobayashi Koichi		1	1	—			1	0	3 – 1
5	Yoda Norimoto	1		1		—	0		0	2 – 2
5	O Rissei	1				1	—	0	0	2 – 2
5	Cho Sonjin		1	1	0		1	—		3 – 1
5	Mimura Tomoyasu	0			1	1	1		—	3 – 1

29th Meijin league (4 December 2003 to summer 2004) Title-holder: Yoda Norimoto

Rank	Player/opponent	YK	RK	CU	OR	CC	OM	KS	IT	YK	Score
1	Yamashita Keigo	—			0					0	0 – 2
2	Rin Kaiho		—	0	0			1			1 – 2
3	Cho U		1	—				1		1	3 – 0
4	O Rissei	1	1		—						2 – 0
5	Cho Chikun					—			0		0 – 1
6	O Meien						—		0		0 – 1
7	Kobayashi Satoru		0	0				—			0 – 2
7	Imamura Toshiya					1	1		—		2 – 0
7	Yamada Kimio	1		0						—	1 – 1

Lightning Go tournament, in which she defeated Nakazawa Ayako 5-dan by 5½ points holding black (no date was published for the game, which was televised in January). Kobayashi also holds the Women's Meijin title, and her latest victory made her the first woman ever to hold three titles concurrently.

Incidentally, her Honinbo success also ensured that her marriage to Cho U early in 2004 (see below) combined the two Honinbo titles in one family.

Speaking of family, Kobayashi has now won eight titles, so in the near future she should be able to catch up with her mother, the late Kobayashi (Kitani) Reiko, who holds the record for women players with ten (shared with Sugiuchi Kazuko). She is already in fourth place among women players.

Result:

Game 1 (2 Oct.). Yashiro (B) by resig.

Game 2 (16 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by 6½.

Game 3 (29 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by 7½.

Game 4 (5 Nov.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Kobayashi and Mimura share lead in 59th Honinbo league

After three rounds of the 59th Honinbo league had been completed, Kobayashi Koichi had the sole lead, so speculation started that we might see the first title match between in-laws. However, he stumbled in the fourth round, losing to Mimura Tomoyasu, so the two share the lead.

The big surprise is the bad start of former Honinbo O Meien, but theoretically he could still become the challenger.

29th Meijin league

Two players, Yamada Kimio and Imamura Toshiya, are making their debuts in the league. Not many games have been played yet, but Cho U's good start might be ominous for the other players.

Judan challenger: Cho U or O Meien

The final of the Winners' Section of the 42nd Judan tournament was held on 13 November and was won by Cho U Honinbo (B), who defeated Yoda Norimoto Meijin by 6½ points.

Yoda had a second chance, but he was eliminated from the Losers' Section when he lost to Yamada Kimio 8-dan. In the final of the Losers' Section, Yamada lost to O Meien 9-dan, so the latter will meet Cho in the play-off to decide the challenger to O Rissei Judan.

Amateur Honinbo vs. professional Honinbo

The 41st playoff between the holders of the amateur and professional Honinbo titles was held in the Sunshine Culture Hall in Ikebukuro on 8 November. Taking two stones plus three points reverse komi, the amateur Honinbo, Harada Minoru, made a one-point mistake late in the end-game and so had to be content with a jigo.

Previously, the komi was adjusted by 2½ points each time, but it has been increased to 3 points to match the new komi.

O Rissei reaches 900-win milestone

Victory over Yoda Meijin in the opening round of the Honinbo league on 30 October gave O Rissei Judan his 900th win. He is the ninth player to reach this milestone in Japan and, at 44 years 11 months, the third-youngest, after Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Koichi. It took him 31 years six months, which puts him in fourth place, following the above two players and Kato Masao.

O's record is 900 wins to 448 losses, which gives him a winning percentage of 66.7. Only a very few players manage to win two thirds of their games.

To put this statistic in perspective, Komatsu Hideki 9-dan recorded his 600th win in the same month. What surprises us about this feat is that he is only the 37th player to reach this milestone.

Hane defends Okan title

The final of the 44th Okan (Crown) title, which is open to members of the Central Japan (Nagoya) branch of the Nihon Ki-in, was held on 10 November. Holding white, Hane Naoki defeated the challenger, Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan, by 3½ points to win this title for the second year in a row and the third time overall. He needs one more win to match his father, Yasumasa 9-dan.

Three weddings

Two professionals at the Nihon Ki-in got married late last year. On 30 November, Ko Reibun 4-dan married Kobayashi Sayaka, the eldest daughter of Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan. Ko is

the son of Nie Weiping 9-dan and Kong Shangming 8-dan, but he is a naturalized Japanese.

On 7 December, Yamashita Keigo Kisei married Takanashi Shoko, the younger sister of Takanashi Seiken 8-dan. Takanashi is a go instructor and a popular MC on the Go & Shogi Channel on cable TV.

Cho U Honinbo and Kobayashi Izumi held their wedding at a resort in Okinawa on 12 January. They had planned to get married in March, but they couldn't find time in their busy tournament schedules, so they brought it forward a little.

Suzuki wins Strongest Woman Player title

Suzuki Ayumi 3-dan, who turned 20 on 23 September last year, has scored her first tournament success, winning the 5th Strongest Woman Player title. Holding black in the final, played on 22 December, she defeated Nakazawa Ayako 5-dan by 11½ points.

Sakai wins Kansai Ki-in No. 1 Position title

Sakai Hideyuki 6-dan, the former WAGC champion, has won his first title, which must confirm to him the correctness of his decision to give up medicine and become a go professional. In the 47th Kansai Ki-in No. 1 Position title match, he defeated Yukawa Mitsuhisa 9-dan 2-1.

The results:

Game 1 (23 Oct.). Yukawa (B) by resig.

Game 2 (8 Nov.). Sakai (B) by resig.

Game 3 (20 Nov.). Sakai (W) by resig.

10th Ricoh Cup

The team of Inori Yoko 5-dan and Cho Chikun, 25th Honinbo, was bidding for its third successive victory in the Ricoh Cup, a professional Pair Go tournament, but in the final, held at the Ebisu Garden Hall in Tokyo on 25 January, they lost to Kobayashi Izumi, Women's Meijin & Honinbo, and Yamashita Keigo Kisei. Izumi/Yamashita had white and won by resignation.

First prize is five million yen, of which one million is donated to promote go (buying go equipment for schools throughout Japan).

Retirement

Kurosawa Tadanao 9-dan retired on 30 November. Born on 1 February 1940, Kurosawa was a disciple of Nakamura Yutaro 9-dan and became 1-dan in 1959. He reached 9-dan in 1987.

Obituary

Ishige Kakuo died on 23 October. Born on 13 April 1925, Ishige became a professional in 1943 and reached 7-dan in 1966. Upon his retirement in 1992, he was promoted to 8-dan.

Ishige was one of the players who left the Nihon Ki-in in 1947 to found the Igo Shinsha (New Go Society). He returned in 1949. He was a member of the group that toured China in 1963. For many years, Ishige was a director of the Nihon Ki-in. He was a leading member of its haiku group.

News from Korea

Yi Ch'ang-ho wins 34th Myeong-in title

Yi Ch'ang-ho has won this title for the 12th time, rebuffing the challenger of Cho Hun-hyeon, and so has matched the latter's record. He has also set a new record by playing in the title match 14 years in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (10 Oct.). Cho (B) by resig.
Game 2 (13 Nov.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 3 (5 Dec.). Yi (W) by resig.
Game 4 (12 Dec.). Cho (W) by resig.
Game 5 (15 Dec.). Yi (W) by resig.

8th LG Petroleum Cup

This *haya-go* (fast go) tournament used to be run on the challenger system, with the challenger being decided by an eight-player league, but now it is a knockout. To update *The Go Player's Almanac*, Yi Ch'ang-ho won the 6th title in 2001, defeating Ch'oe Myeong-hun 3-0. In 2002, Yi Se-tol 3-dan defeated Ch'oe Myeong-hun 3-1.

In 2003 the final was fought between Yi Ch'ang-ho and Cho Han-seung 6-dan. The former won the title match 3-0 to take this title for the fourth time. It is his 117th title.

First prize is 45 million won; second is 7 million.

The results:

Game 1 (7 Oct.). Yi (W) by resig.
Game 2 (10 Oct.). Yi (B) by resig.
Game 3 (20 Nov.). Yi (W) by resig.

Cho wins Women's Kuksu

Cho Hye-yeon 4-dan (aged 18) scored a major triumph in the 9th Women's Kuksu (National Champion) title match, defeating the reigning

champion, Rui Naiwei 9-dan, 2-0. Since joining the Korean Ki-in in March 1999, Rui had dominated the women's titles and also become the first woman professional in any country to win an open title, when she defeated Cho Hun-hyeon to take the 43rd Kuksu title in 2000. She won the Women's Kuksu for three years in a row (2000 to 2002).

It's hard to get the story straight with Korean tournaments because of the repeated metamorphoses they undergo. As far as we can work out, this tournament started out with the standard titleholder vs. challenger format, as described in *The Go Player's Almanac 2001*. However, in 1998, it apparently switched to a knockout tournament ending in a play-off. Then in the 7th term in 2000 it switched to parallel winners' and losers' knockout tournaments, like Japan's Judan, but with the difference that the winner of the losers' tournament meets the winner of the winners' tournament in a best-of-three title match.

The tournament skipped a year in 2001, which is why the 9th term was played in 2003. The 7th to 9th terms have followed the same pattern, with Rui defeating Cho in the final of the winners' tournament, and Cho winning the losers' tournament but then losing the title match to Rui (2-1 and 2-0 in the 7th and 8th terms).

In the 9th term, Cho finally gained the upper hand over Rui, taking the title with two straight wins.

Rui turned 40 on 28 December, but we are sure she'll be making a comeback, both in local and international competition.

The results:

Game 1 (3 Nov.). Cho (W) by ½.
Game 2 (11 Nov.). Cho (B) by 1½.

Game 2 is given on page 57.

8th Bacchus Cup: Chunweon Tournament

This title was won by the 18-year-old Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 5-dan, who defeated the slightly younger (born in July 1985 as against Ch'eol's March) Weon Seong-chin 5-dan 3-1. This is Ch'oe's first title.

The results:

Game 1 (28 Nov.). Weon (W) by 1½.
Game 2 (8 Dec.). Ch'oe (W) by resig.
Game 3 (13 Dec.). Ch'oe (B) by 2½.
Game 4 (18 Dec.). Ch'oe (W) by 2½.

News from China

Chinese individual championships

These were held from 16 to 27 September 2003. In the men's championship, an 11-round Swiss in which 126 players competed, the winner was Kong Jie 7-dan. Second place went to Peng Quan 5-dan and third to Liu Shizhen 5-dan.

In the women's championship, held over nine rounds, the winner was Ye Gui 5-dan.

Zhang wins 1st Jianqiao Cup

The Jianqiao Cup Chinese Women's Open is a new tournament in which the preliminaries were conducted on the Net to choose the 16 players to compete in the main section. In the final, held on 19 November, Zhang Xuan 8-dan (B) defeated Huang Jia 2-dan by 3½ points.

Agon-Kiriyama Cup

The final of the 5th Chinese Agon-Kiriyama Cup was held on 30 November and was won by Gu Li 7-dan. Holding black, he defeated Kong Jie 7-dan by resignation.

Qiu wins 16th Mingren

The 21-year-old Qiu Jun 6-dan has won his first big title, defeating Zhou Heyang 9-dan in the 16th Mingren title match.

The results:

Game 1 (4 Jan.). Qiu (W) by resig.
Game 2 (6 Jan.). Qiu (B) by resig.
Game 3 (8 Jan.). Zhou (B) by
Game 4 (10 Jan.). Zhou (W) by
Game 5 (11 Jan.). Qiu (W) by resig.

Chinese ratings

Unfortunately, there's usually a time lag of a few months before we get the details of the latest rating list from China. The list below gives the top ten players as of 31 August 2003.

1. Gu Li 7-dan: 2719
2. Kong Jie 7-dan: 2709
3. Zhou Heyang 9-dan: 2678
4. Yu Bin 9-dan: 2662
5. Wang Lei 8-dan: 2660
6. Hu Yaoyu 7-dan: 2651
7. Chang Hao 9-dan: 2621
8. Peng Quan 5-dan: 2620
9. Ma Xiaochun 9-dan: 2609
10. Luo Xihe 9-dan: 2608

2003 Japanese Go in Statistics

Below is a statistical overview of 2003 and a list of the Kido Prizes. You can probably guess how most of the latter went as you read through the statistics.

Most prize money

For the first time that we can remember, this was almost a dead heat. Cho win in the Chunlan Cup right at the end of the year is what made the difference.

We take the list as far as the top 13 because of the interest of the last two players appearing in it.

1. Cho U Honinbo: ¥77,898,850 (about \$741,000)
2. Yamashita Keigo Kisei: ¥77,874,000
3. Yoda Norimoto Meijin: ¥62,506,349
4. O Rissei Judan: ¥46,563,571
5. Hane Naoki Tengen: ¥41,206,518
6. Cho Chikun, 25th Honinbo: ¥34,712,702
7. Ryu Shikun 9-dan: ¥31,236,091
8. Kato Masao 9-dan: ¥28,991,278
9. O Meien 9-dan: ¥25,537,171
10. Takao Shinji 8-dan: ¥23,985,187
11. Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan: ¥20,870,523
12. Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan: ¥19,676,800
13. Kobayashi Izumi, Women's Honinbo: ¥18,008,894

Most games won

1. Cho U Honinbo: 56–21 (second year in a row for Cho, though he didn't come close to his record total of 70 wins in 2002). He also played the most games (76). This is the fifth year in a row that Cho has won 50 or more games.
2. Takao Shinji 8-dan: 51–19
3. Kono Rin 7-dan: 46–13
4. Yamada Kimio 8-dan: 44–13; Kin Shujun 7-dan: 44–13
6. So Yokoku 7-dan: 43–12
7. Matsumoto Takehisa 6-dan: 38–15; Hane Naoki Tengen: 38–20; Cho Chikun, 25th Honinbo: 38–28
10. Mizokami Tomochika 7-dan: 35–18

Best winning percentage

1. So Yokoku: 78.18%
2. Kono Rin: 77.97%
3. Yamada Kimio, Kim Shujun: 77.19%

Continued on page 14

Go World 100th Issue Commemorative Quiz

Games of Go on Disk (GoGoD) wishes to mark the achievement of Richard Bozulich, John Power and the rest of the *Go World* team in reaching a significant landmark. Long may they continue.

They were supported by legions of loyal readers, of course. We — John Fairbairn and T. Mark Hall — are therefore donating 100 of the latest and complete GoGoD CDs — each worth \$60 — as prizes for those readers in a brief competition where everyone can be a winner!

Here are the rules:

1. Answer all the questions below. They are multiple-choice, so guess if you have to. A proportion of the questions are based on, or can be answered from, issues of *Go World* so as to favour slightly those who have been subscribing the longest.
2. Send your answers to GoGoD only, preferably by e-mail to tmark@gogod.demon.co.uk. E-mail entries will be acknowledged. You may also send your entry by ordinary post to T. Mark Hall, 47 Cedars Road, Clapham, London SW4 0PN, United Kingdom, but no acknowledgement will be sent in this case. You must include the address you want us to send any prize to or else your entry will be disqualified.
3. Only one entry per household is allowed; only home addresses are allowed.
4. Entries should reach us by 1 May 2004. Prize CDs will be sent out within the following month. All prizewinners will be listed in *Go World* 102.
5. Winners will be determined on the basis of the 100 best scores. If there are any ties, a random draw will be made from these.
6. Decisions on any aspect of the competition will be entirely at the discretion of GoGoD, and those decisions will be final and not open to correspondence.

Here are the questions:

1. By which name is Kitani known in *The Master of Go*? A. Otake B. Kitani C. Wu
2. Which pro is known for humming folk songs during games?
A. Cho Hun-hyeon B. Cho Chikun C. Cho Sonjin D. Cho U
3. What was the nonstop lightning-go record set by David Mitchell in 1977?
A. 83 hours B. 46 hours C. 91 hours
4. Who was the first 1-dan to beat a 9-dan with White in tournament play?
A. Takemiya Masaki B. Shinkai Hiroko C. Ninomiya Hideko D. Yi Ch'ang-ho
5. Where did the X-Y-Z Club gather? A. The ABC Café B. The Kitani Dojo C. The Kansai Ki-in
6. Who was the first Kitani pupil to score a perfect record in the Honinbo league?
A. Ishida Yoshio B. Cho Chikun C. Kobayashi Koichi D. Takemiya Masaki
7. Which famous film star has a father who wrote a go book?
A. Rita Hayworth B. Merle Oberon C. Joan Fontaine
8. In his 1996 flight in Endeavor, Daniel T. Barry played over a game in space featuring which player?
A. Shuwa B. Shusaku C. Shusai D. Shuko
9. Which country did Iwamoto Kaoru not live in for at least a year?
A. USA B. Japan C. Brazil D. Korea E. Netherlands
10. Who was the first Westerner to become a professional in Japan outside Tokyo?
A. Manfred Wimmer B. Catalin Taranu C. James Kerwin
11. Who was the go collector who gave *Go World* the benefit of his collection and expertise?
A. Yasunaga Hajime B. William Pinckard C. Yahata Kyosuke
12. Which pro was known as the Iron Goalkeeper?
A. Ma Xiaochun B. Nie Weiping C. Seo Pong-su
13. How many (0, 1, 2 or 3) of the following famous chess players did not play go?
Edward Lasker, Emanuel Lasker, Max Lange
14. Who said, 'The clamshells are heavy today'?
A. Kajiwara Takeo B. Kitani Minoru C. Honinbo Shusai

15. Which issue of *Go World* shows Tadanobu plotting revenge at the go board?
 A. 13 B. 18 C. 23 D. 33 E. 73
16. Which pro played the Crown Prince of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal, at Tibetan go?
 A. Iyomoto Momoichi B. Iwamoto Kaoru C. Go Seigen
17. What is the name of the famous board on display at the Nihon Ki-in?
 A. Flower B. Moon C. Snow
18. Who is know as the 'female Yi Ch'ang-ho'? A. Cho Hye-yeon B. Pak Chi-eun C. Rui Naiwei
19. How many of these ancient Chinese philosophers mentioned go? (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4)?
 Confucius, Zhuang Zi, Mencius, Lao Zi
20. Who was the oldest player to win a place in the Meijin league?
 A. Go Seigen B. Hashimoto Utau C. Iwamoto Kaoru

The main prizes are single issues of the latest (Winter 2003) GoGoD. Winners of these who are already GoGoD subscribers will be offered a free annual subscription extension instead (please indicate in your entry if that is what you want). The CD contains over 20,000 professional games in sgf format plus a wealth of features, dictionaries and programs. The CD is Windows-based but Mac and other users should be able to access the games and the html documents. More details are on our website: www.gogod.demon.co.uk

In addition, all unsuccessful entrants will be entitled to a 10% discount on any GoGoD purchase made before 1 November 2004.

Go World News (Continued from page 11)

5. Rin Kanketsu 5-dan: 75.56% (34-11)
 6. Nakamura Shinya 8-dan: 73.53% (25-9)
 7. Rin Shien 6-dan: 73.17% (30-11)
 8. Takao Shinji: 72.86%
 9. Cho U, Kono Rin: 72.73%

Most games played

1. Cho U: 77
 2. Takao Shinji: 70
 3. Cho Chikun: 66

Most successive wins

1. Yamada Kimio: 18

2. Takao Shinji, Kim Shujun: 15
 3. Yamada Kimio: 14

Kido Prizes

1. Most outstanding player: Cho U Honinbo/Oza
 2. Outstanding players: Yamashita Kisei, Yoda Meijin, and Hane Tengen
 3. New Star: So Yokoku Shinjin-O
 4. Top woman player: Kobayashi Izumi
 5. International: Cho Chikun
 6. Most wins: Cho U
 7. Best winning percentage: So Yokoku
 8. Most successive wins: Yamada Kimio
 9. Most games: Cho U

Have you ever wanted a simple way to answer the millennium-old question, "What is Go?" GO! More Than a Game is the most comprehensive introduction to the game ever published.

After a short synopsis of the game's incredible history and the different things the game has meant to so many cultures, *Go!* gets the reader interested in playing immediately. With over 650 diagrams, it begins with a uniquely abbreviated version of the Capture Game and takes a patient, game-oriented approach through 9x9 and 13x13 games, to the full experience of playing on a 19x19 board. Chronicling the vast

changes in strategies and styles of play, *Go!* follows the game from its roots in ancient Chinese mythology and Taoism through its appearance in literature and art, to the modern role it is playing in the fields of mathematics, business, psychology and computers. *Go! More Than a Game* will enable its readers to play and converse intelligently with anyone who has ever been involved in the game.



GO!
More Than A Game
 by Peter Shotwell
 7 1/4 x 9 1/4 200 pp
 0-8048-3475-X pb US\$14.95



TUTTLE PUBLISHING

A MEMBER OF THE PERIPLUS PUBLISHING GROUP

Airport Industrial Park • 364 Innovation Drive • North Clarendon, VT 05759-9436 USA

Available wherever books are sold. To order or for a complete catalog call 1-800-526-2778 or 1-802-773-8930

www.tuttlepublishing.com

The 58th Honinbo Title Match: Kato Masao vs. Cho U



The 2003 Honinbo title match gets underway (Kato is playing move 5).

This year's Honinbo title match presented a strong contrast between youth and experience. The challenger was the latest star from Taiwan to take centre stage in Japanese go, Cho U. Two years ago, at the age of 21 and three months, Cho caused a stir by becoming the youngest player ever to challenge for a big-three title when he played O Meien in the 56th Honinbo title match. Although he missed the chance to set the bigger record that was on offer, here he was back to have another crack and still only 23.

Kato, on the other hand, has been stuck with the appellation of 'veteran' for some time now. Born in March 1947, he set a contrasting record to Cho last year: the oldest player ever to win the Honinbo title. Actually, he has turned out to have the greatest longevity of the celebrated 'Kitani trio' that hogged the spotlight in the 1970s. He has also outstripped the other two members of the trio, Ishida Yoshio and Takemiya Masaki, in tournament successes, having won 46 titles (now 47) to Ishida's and Takemiya's 24 each*.

* They are very close in top-three titles, with Takemiya having won seven, and Kato and Ishida six each.

Game One: Cho self-destructs

White: Cho U 8-dan

Black: Kato Kensei Honinbo

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each.

Played on Cheju Island, Korea on 14 & 15 May 2003. *Commentary by Otake Hideo, Hon. Gosei.*
Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki.

Figure 1 (1–19). *An experimental fuseki?*

Cho plays very positively in the fuseki, making two two-space high approach moves with 4 and 6. Kato most often plays diagonally opposite 3–4 points or, as in this game, facing 3–4 points when he has black. That means Cho could have planned his opening in advance.

Exclamations of surprise greeted White 8 in the pressroom. The players there (besides Otake, they included Cho Chikun, the referee, Ogaki Yusaku 8-dan, the *Mainichi Newspaper* com-

They have all conspicuously failed to win the Kisei title (despite a total of eight challenges), which no one would have predicted when it was founded in their heyday in 1977.

mentator, and Takemiya Masaki, the satellite-TV commentator) had expected White 1 etc. in *Dia. 1*. After 4 and 6, White can switch to the empty corner with 7. But perhaps Black 'a' is a threat.






Figure 1 (1-19)




Dia. 1: the usual strategy?

Otake: 'After White approaches with 4, both players are, of course, thinking of the bottom right corner. For White 8, opinions would be split between those who would follow *Dia. 1* and those who would tenuki and switch to the bottom right corner. There might not be many people who would think of White 8. But most players would consider White 9 in *Dia. 2* reasonable when White plays the one-space high approach move. With one move, White 9 serves as extensions from the left and from the right. White 8 in the game is similar.'



Dia. 2: a standard strategy

In fine fettle, Black switches to 9 — he has played first in three corners. However, Cho Chikun commented that he would have played the 3-4 point of A. Black always has to worry about the open 3-3 point. Otake agreed. 'The tighter move of 1 in *Dia. 3* is possible, of course. Whatever approach move White plays, Black pincers at 3. The marked black stone is in a good position. Instead of 2 —



Dia. 3: good for Black

Dia. 4: also good

'*Dia. 4*. White will probably play the splitting move at 2. If Black extends to 3, he doesn't have to worry about the 3-3 point. The only thing is that Black 3 is a little slack compared to Black 'a'.'

Black could go as far as 'a', but the wider move leaves White with an invasion point at 'b'.

Instead of 13, Black is tempted to reinforce at Black 14. However, White will ignore this move: he'll occupy a large point at the bottom. That's why Black plays 13.

When White plays 14, Black is ready with the move at 15. If instead he rams into White with B, White exchanges C for Black D, then plays the nasty move of White 15. Black 15 may let White make good shape up to 18, but Black reinforces

solidly with 19. In effect, he is posing a question to White: isn't your two-space extension (10, 12) cramped? Note that this is not the place to be greedy with 19 at E.





Figure 2 (20-31)



Dia. 5: good for White

Figure 2 (20-31). Skilful manoeuvring


We witness some skilful fighting with White 20 to 26. If after 20 Black does nothing in the top left corner, White will attack with the crosscut of 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. In this shape, Black has to go for outside influence with Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', giving White the corner, but with the marked white stones lying in wait this influence does not work effectively. So Black wants to deny White the chance to play 1 and 3.

The simple and direct way to defend is Black 21 at 25. However, this move has no effect on White, so he will switch elsewhere. That's why Black invades at 21.


If White answers the invasion by attaching at 1 in Dia. 6, Black takes profit with 2 and 4 while also forestalling the crosscut. This result would be unpleasant for White, so he tries the strategy

of 22 and 24.

White 24 in response to Black 23 may look like a change of plan, but that's not so. This is his original plan. If instead White crawls at 1 in Dia. 7, Black 2 puts him on the spot. From this diagram, we can see that the exchange of 24 and 25 is appropriate. Just for the record, if White plays immediately at 24 instead of 22, Black will pull his stone out with 26.




Dia. 6: good for Black



Dia. 7: White falls into a trap

Otake: 'Black opted to sacrifice 21 and go for speed. And he secured sente as planned. On the other hand, White has built thickness and made good shape. He may have taken gote, but he still has the aji of White A in the corner. The result is even. People will differ on the evaluation of the overall position, but I think that White may be a fraction ahead.'

Black switches to 27 with his sente. A 3-3 invasion or a contact play at B would, after all, be big.



Dia. 8: speedier development

Otake: 'The move that bothers me in this opening is Black 27. Black has chosen to go for speed, sacrificing a stone in the top left corner. In that case, shouldn't he continue the emphasis on speed and make an approach move at 1 in Dia.

8? White 28 is the last large point of the opening. It's true Black can play at 31, but this is a *sabaki* move, played after White has added a stone.'





Figure 3 (32-64)

Figure 3 (32-64). Kato's play is queried.

Otake: 'The sequence from 32 to 47 is considered a joseki, but White's corner territory is quite big. I can't help wondering if this flow is good enough for Black in this game.' To Otake's eyes, this result is dubious. The cause lies in Black 27 in the previous figure.


When White caps at 48, Black's next move is difficult. The cap at A leaps to the eye, but White will play B or 54 and won't have any particular trouble settling himself. On the contrary, once White has settled himself, a white counterattack at C will be frightening.



Dia. 9: not to Otake's liking

Otake: 'Black goes all out for territory with 51 and 53. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 9 next, Black will try to convert all the bottom right into territory with 2 and 4 (or 'a'). Playing like this makes me feel uncomfortable. I can't play such moves, so I avoid positions in which one would have to attach and pull back as with 51 and 53.

That means following a different strategy. The only thing is that the ability to play like this is also Kato's strong point.'




Dia. 10: more like Kato?


The players in the pressroom also queried 51 and 53. They thought that splitting White into two with 1 and 3 in Dia. 10 would have been more typical of Kato. Moves enclosing territory generally meet with a bad reception from professionals.

In contrast, there's White 54. This move was well received. The black group in the top left is rock solid, so solidifying it further doesn't hurt. That's the idea behind White 54.

Otake: 'Just the kind of move you'd expect from the in-form Cho. If possible, Black would like to switch elsewhere. However, White 1 in Dia. 11 becomes a good move. As you might expect, when White gets a stone this close, White 'a' becomes a nasty threat. Even so, Black 55 and 57 are very patient. White is satisfied when he gets Black to play so submissively.'



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Following Black 57, if White just goes by shape, the two-step hane of White 1 in Dia. 12 is the move. In this game, however, the cut of Black 2 will put White on the spot. So White steps back to take a breath with 58. He responds to the peep of 59 by extending at 60. At this point, Black cuts at 61. Otake had an interesting comment.

'Peeping at 59 has value in itself. Even more so, if he can make White connect at 61. Cutting at 61 after 59 decreases the value of the peep by a half. But another way of looking at it is that, because the opponent switched elsewhere, Black 61 shows fighting spirit. He's saying: "You're not connecting even though I peeped? Well, then, I'm cutting."'

However, Kato was full of regret for his play around here after the game. He wondered if Black 61 should have been at 62 and if 63 should have been at D. It seems that the flow of the game has turned completely in White's favour.





Figure 4 (65-94)




Dia. 13: White's counter?

Figure 4 (65-94). Cho confident he's ahead

Apparently the same thing can be said of Black 65 [as of 59]. Forcing White to connect at 83 is what would make the peep valuable. But Cho doesn't connect. He forces with 66 (the sealed move at the end of the first day), then switches to 68.

The frightening thing for White is Black's setting his stone at the top in motion with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13*. If White 'a', Black crawls at 'b'; the hane of Black 'c' sets up the cut of 'd', which would be a nuisance. In answer to Black 3 —




Dia. 14: Black is too thin

Dia. 14. White 1 is a good move. Black is thin in the result here, so he won't want to play this way. That being so, White has no obligation to answer Black 65 in the figure.

White has ignored Black's peep, which is looking ineffective. He has invested an extra stone on the centre, which has started to look whitish. Black plays 69 to prevent White from pressing there.

Otake: 'White 70 is a difficult point. The moves to 80 are a consistent flow, but I can't believe that White has profited. But if you ask me how he should have played, that's difficult. If White does nothing, Black will set out to swallow up two white stones with Black A, White B, Black C. Well, Cho has made the judgement that the sequence to 80 is playable. It's resolute play.'

Just for the record: White 78 at 1 in *Dia. 15* doesn't work. After 2 and 4, Black defends at 6. The cut of White 'a' is refuted by Black 'b'; White 'c' is countered by Black 'd'.




Dia. 15: White falls into a trap

White takes profit up to 78, then switches to 80. He has attached a string to his two stones. Doubtless, as Otake surmised, Cho felt that the game was not bad for him at this stage.

The reins have been passed into Black's hands, but he's hard put to find a move. As mentioned earlier, setting his stone at the top in motion with Black 86 is not inviting. If 70 represents a resolute decision by White, Black's moves from 81 show similar resolution.

Otake: 'Pushing along at 81 is the prologue to

cutting at 83. It's a forcing move before making White capture with 84 and 86. As I indicated earlier, the value of 65 lies in making the peep and its value increases if he can make White connect. I can't believe that Kato really wanted to cut at 83. His upper left corner is rock solid. Adding a little scrap of territory to that corner can't be what Kato was really aiming at.'



In short, one gets the feeling that Kato felt compelled to play 83 and 85. In the worst case, there's a possibility White might cut with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*. If Black captures a stone with 4, White 5 and 7 become possible. To continue, if Black turns at 1 in *Dia. 17*, White captures him with 2 to 12. Consequently, Black will probably counter with 4 at 'a' in *Dia. 16*. For Black, the existence of this threat (1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*) is disturbing.

Otake: 'A best-of-seven, with its two-day games, requires a different kind of power from ordinary games. After all, if the match goes the distance, you are fighting with the same opponent for about three months. This fight starts when the challenger is decided. A different kind of concentration and fighting spirit are required than with ordinary games. Reluctant though Kato was to cut at 83, this move can also be said to embody a kind of fighting spirit.'

Black 83 and 85 eliminate the threat of the cut (1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*) (though for White the threat of Black 86 has also been eliminated). This accomplished, Black pokes his head out with 87.


There's a very big move left at the top: a white atari at 93 versus Black's descent there. The players in the pressroom expected White to play 88 at 93.

Otake: 'White's play with 88, 90 and 92

couldn't be tighter. Usually you'd atari at 93 without thinking twice.' Otake added that you could tell from these moves that Cho felt he was ahead. And, in fact, most of the professionals following the game backed Cho at this point. Kato also realized that the game was not developing in his favour. He was groping for a do-or-die move. Cho may have played the tight moves from 82 to 90 because he guessed how Kato felt.

Black 93 is the biggest move on the board. Then White plays 94.

Otake: 'This diagonal move is strange. Considering he's the same player who played so tightly with 82 to 90, you wonder if he couldn't win with White 1 in *Dia. 18*. When White gets a stone here, he can look forward to playing White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. What's more, he could also aim at 1 and 3 in *Dia. 19*.' Otake's reason for making this comment is that the do-or-die move of Black D is played later. Perhaps Cho thought that if he played 94 he would have enough ko threats to fight the ko after D.



When he sees 94, Kato scents a chance. The only way to open up the game is with a do-or-die move.



Cho has the lead, but . . .




Figure 5 (95–109)
109: ko

Figure 5 (95–109). *Kato starts the ko.*

There's a move Black can aim at on the right: attaching at A. However, if he plays it immediately, White will parry with B—Black C—White 98, a result that's nothing special for Black. Once Black gets 95 and 97 in place, though, White has to defend at 98 without delay.


Black 95 is preparation for initiating the ko fight with 103. If a ko fight starts, it's not hard to imagine that White will use his ko threats in the top right corner. When that happens, the stone at 95 might contribute to rescuing the top right corner group. The reason why Black doesn't play his sente move at 108 in the bottom left is also because he wants to leave it for ko threats.

After making the preparations to 101, Kato resolutely starts the ko with 103. Black also suffers a lot of damage if he loses this ko, so the usual assessment would be that it's not feasible. As he's behind, however, Black has no choice. There's no other move that gives him a chance of turning the tables on White. The game is no longer a close contest.


Otake: 'I wouldn't cut immediately with 104 but instead would play the probe of 1 in *Dia. 20*. Because I'm a coward.'

This move appears quite soon in the game, but it is used as a ko threat. Otake would prefer to use it as a probe. If Black answers at 'a', White continues with 'b', making these two moves an effective combination. Of course, there's a possibility that Black will answer by cutting at 2. But this would be better than the game. The sequence in the game is shown in

Dia. 21. The result there is equivalent to exchanging White 2 for Black 3 after the marked white stone and Black 1 have been played.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21





Figure 6 (110–129)



Dia. 22: better for White

Figure 6 (110–129). *An unbelievable move*
Kato finished off the ko with 11, according to

plan. The problem now is the status of the top right black group. If Black can save it, the game will be good for him; if White can capture it or obtain compensation equal to the ko, he will have the lead. When White makes the placement at 16, Black can't live in the corner.

Black 21 would usually be a bad move. But, according to Otake, White's next move, 22, is unbelievable, a major blunder, a sign of temporary derangement.

Otake: 'White 22 is a place you don't play in a million years. Either you connect at 24 or you defend at A; there's nothing else.'

Either of these moves would have been good for White. Let's look at the former, that is, 1 in *Dia. 22*. Up to 5, the improvement on the game for White is obvious.

Admittedly, it is possible for Black to continue by attaching at 1 in *Dia. 23*. However, having to rely on this technique to save the group is wretched. To start with, White can cut at 6 (a big difference from the game). Furthermore, Black has to resort to the ko with 7 and 9 in *Dia. 24* — 'a variation I don't even want to think about', in Otake's words. White has already taken profit with 6 in *Dia. 23*, so playing successive moves at B and C in the figure would be good enough.




Figure 7 (130–154). Black rescues his group.

At this point, a professional's instincts tell him that saving Black's group is possible.

What is the basis of this instinctive feeling? Otake: 'If Black plays A–White B–Black C in the corner, White must play at D. Alternatively, Black could throw in at E. In short, Black has many sente moves in this area. Let's assume, for example, that White plays 30 at 1 in *Dia. 25*. If Black 2, White 3 is forced. We can assume that

Black plunges into the top up to 6. White seems to just barely cope with this with 7 and 9. However, Black saves his group with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 26*. Black 5 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.'





Figure 7 (130–154)

51: ko (left of 48)

54: ko (at 48)



If we [*Monthly Go World*] had the space to look at this position in detail, we could easily present ten life-and-death problems. Cho Chikun, that master of *shinogi* (saving weak groups) who was on the spot, commented that White couldn't hope to kill the group.

With 31 on, Black marches towards safety. He is ready to fight a ko at any time if White cuts at 44. In contrast to the ko to link up on the first line in *Dia. 24*, White also has a lot at stake. Black welcomes the ko.

Otake: 'Pressing at 37 is the finishing touch. With things having gone this far, White has no choice but to fight the ko at 44.'

The problem for White is that he doesn't have any good ko threats. In contrast, Black has an excellent ko threat at 49. The marked black stone was originally a *son-ko* (a ko threat that loses points), but now it proves its value.



He who laughs last . . . for much of the time the flow of the game was against Kato, but the wily veteran prevailed in the end.





Figure 8 (155–183)

Figure 8 (155–183). Cho self-destructs.

To wrap up our commentary, we would like to go back to Figure 6. When White peeped (the marked stone) in *Dia. 27*, Black attached at 'a'. White's answer at 'b' was a major blunder. If instead he had played at 'c', Black 'a' would have become a bad move.



Dia. 27: correct play for both sides

The correct move is connecting with Black 1. This is the only move. White will respond by extending at 2. What is the final result in this variation? We apologize to the reader, but all we can say, on the basis of the analysis of Otake and the other professionals on the spot, is that the chances of living are 50–50. That means that Cho's judgement that he could bring down the group with two successive moves was mistaken.

Otake: 'Cho has confidence in his reading. So he concluded that he 'could do it'. You can say that he ended up self-destructing precisely because of this confidence in his reading. In that

sense, the aftereffects he'll suffer from this game will be minor.'

When Black plays 55, White has to finish off the ko. Black's second move in a row here, 57, decides the issue.

Because of Black's aggressive move with 59, there are some final complications. Black 59 at 60, letting White live, would be good enough — Black could then switch to 77. However, Black plays calmly with 73 to 77, so the outcome is not affected. Black 77 is big, as it forestalls White A.

Otake: 'I would hesitate to call this a great game. But it is one that really makes you feel the fighting spirit of a best-of-seven. We can look forward to great games later in the series.'

White resigns after Black 183.

(Monthly Go World, July 2003)



Cho waits for the second game to start. He had to make up for letting a good game slip out of his hands in the series opener.

Game Two: Obstinacy a pitfall

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho U

Played at the Station Hotel Kokura, Kokura Kita Ward, Kita-Kyushu City on 26 & 27 May 2003.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan. Report by Inoue Yuji.

Figure 1 (1–21). Fuseki considerations

Ishida: 'Black pulls back at 7, leaving it up to White to decide the continuation. The latter could play at 9 or A or at 8, as in the game.'






Figure 1 (1–21)



Dia. 1: good for Black



Dia. 2: good for Black

Black 11. Black B would also be good, of course.

White 14. Ishida: 'If White plays at 1 in Dia. 1, Black plays the joseki of 2 to 6. If next White 7, Black 8 becomes a good point. White will be reluctant to answer at 'a'.'

Black tries to keep the game busy with 15 so that White doesn't get a chance to attack Black's stones on the right side.

White 16 is feasible, but unusual, according to Ishida. If White jumps to 1 in Dia. 2, the joseki to 10 follows. Black has played on both sides, and White's outside thickness is not effective [as there are black stones to left and right].

Black 17. Ishida: 'If at 19, White settles himself with 17–Black C–White D. Black 17 leads to the result to 21. It's a while since I've seen this in a professional game.'





Figure 2 (22-50)



Dia. 3: not interesting


Figure 2 (22-50). Kato-style obstinacy

Black 23. Anyone could come up with jumping to A or crawling at 36, but ramming into White with 23 is a good move; it makes miai of 30 and 31.

White 24. Ishida: 'White 1 in Dia. 3, letting Black link up with 2, is uninteresting. After White 3, Black will make the same move at 4 as before. If White 3 at 'a', Black 'b'. Even if you were not Kato Honinbo, you'd want to block the connection with White 30. Putting aside the question of whether it's good or not ...'


The aim of White 30 is to make the three black stones on the left a target for attack, but the white group itself is hardly a strong one. The difficult thing here is to strike the right balance. The question of whether or not White can lead the game into a favourable development for him depends on his later play.

The result, as seen in later figures, is that things don't work out well for White, but at this point the causes of this still lie in the future.



Dia. 4: a possible strategy

Looking back, 'using White 34 to settle the group by extending into the corner with 1 in Dia. 4 would have been a good strategy. White 'a' is sente, forcing Black 'b', so White is alive. The difference in territory is not small — at least equivalent to the komi.' (Ishida) The only thing is that Black is no longer susceptible to attack when he takes up position with 2.




Dia. 5: better for White

White 36. Ishida: 'Blocking here is Kato style, but it's an obstinate move. It's probably bad. The knight's move of 1 in Dia. 5 would have been lighter.' Black can exchange 'a' for

White 'b', so Black 'c' is a threat, but even so White can poke his head out with 'd' through 'h'. If instead Black cuts with Black 'e'—White 'c'—Black 'g', White seems quite unlikely to die.

Ishida: 'White 1 in *Dia. 6* might look like another possibility for 36, but Black can play 2 to 6, then cut across the knight's move with 8, which is nasty. Playing 4 immediately at 8 also looks possible.'



Dia. 6: a tough fight for White

Black stops White from linking up on the edge with 43, so the game is plunged into risky and scrappy fighting.

After strengthening his top position with 47 and 49, Black unleashes a severe attack.




Figure 3 (51-87)

Figure 3 (51-87). *Cho attacks strongly.*

The severe move with which the challenger lets fly is Black 51. When Black presses here, moving out has become difficult for White. Kato spent 55 minutes considering 52.

After the continuation to White 62, Black pushes through and cuts with 63 and 65, splitting White into two in the centre. The top right white



O Meien and Otake studying the game

group has to live. Ishida: 'Having to seek eye shape with moves like 68 and 72 is painful.' As seen later, Black has a sente endgame move at 85 and Black A will also be sente.


When Black switches to 73, he has the lead. Ishida: 'The three black stones in the top left are no longer susceptible to attack.'

Black continues to play aggressively, attacking at the vital point of White's group with 77. Ishida: 'Instead of this move, peeping at Black B would have been good enough. If White C, Black D puts him on the spot. This also eliminates the aji of White's moving out with 54.'

Black doesn't let up. Even though that gives White chances to create complications, Cho U likes to go all out.

White 82. Pushing down at 1 in *Dia. 7* doesn't accomplish anything. The sequence to 6 helps Black to strengthen himself on both sides.

After Black 87, Kato took 66 minutes and sealed the next move.



Dia. 7: helping Black



Otake opens the sealed-move envelope . . .



... and shows it to Cho for verification.





Figure 4 (88–110)



Dia. 8: Black wins the fight

Figure 4 (88–110). Two eyeless groups

White 90. Ishida: 'If White answers at 1 in Dia. 8, Black plays 2 and 4 in sente, then hane at 6. After the continuation to 13, Black has time to defend at 14. If White challenges him to a capturing race by destroying his potential eye at the top with 'a', Black plays 'b', and it's obvious that he wins the fight.'

The cut of 95, played to see how White answers, is exquisite. If White plays 98 at 108, Black exchanges 101 for White 98 and can link up with A.

The fight continues. Both the black and white groups are eyeless, but there's more pressure on White.




Figure 5 (111–160)

Figure 5 (111–160). Assured of victory

With 17 and 18, both groups have been secured, and the long fight that started in the upper right has come to a pause. And the challenger has kept a tight grip on the lead.

White has no choice about the approach move of 20. If Black gets to make an extension to A, he threatens to play B; this makes miai of C and D, so White would be in trouble.

White 22. Ishida: 'If at 47, Black plays 22.' Black 23 secures a 30-point territory.

White 30 is an excellent move for laying waste to territory. In response, Black 31 is a steady move that shows Black is trying to wrap up the game. If instead Black blocks at E in an attempt to capture White, a ko results. Black prefers to avoid complications.

Switching to the large endgame move of 41 puts the game in the bag.

White 60. If White blocks to the left of 59, Black pushes up at 60 and cuts; he then sacrifices his two stones for a squeeze, and White will find that he has made no profit.

Figure 6 (161–205). Back to even

Black 67. Black 68 (White extends up), followed by hane + connection on the second line, seems better, but Black is ahead anyway.

Black 83 is a good endgame move — Black 87 becomes sente.

The series has become a best-of-five.

White resigns after Black 205.

(Monthly Go World, July 2003)




Figure 6 (161–205)



Ishida Akira 9-dan, the referee, watches the start of Game Three.

Game Three: The old Kato is back

White: Cho U

Black: Kato Masao

Played at the Hotel Nikko Chitose in Chitose City, Hokkaido on 2 & 3 June 2003.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan, supplemented through reference to the Mainichi Newspaper and Go Weekly (given in brackets). Report by Matsuura Takahito.

Figure 1 (1–28). The calm before the storm

Playing over this game, I was struck with astonishment several times. Kato is raging around the go board, as if he had reverted to his 'Kato the killer' days.

The reader probably finds this hard to imag-

ine, looking at the steady pace of the opening in this figure. Of course, if you have confidence in your fighting strength, you don't have to resort to little tricks in the opening. Kato probably didn't even consider moves like Black 11 at 13 or Black 17 at A.





Figure 1 (1–28)

There is one key point in the fuseki: the pincer of 25. When Black plays here, it's only too obvious that White can play the checking extension of 26. Imagining that White would pull out his stone at 6, letting one follow up after 25 with an approach move at B, would be the epitome of self-indulgence. No professional would miss White 26.

If so, what is Kato's aim? The answer is the jump to 27. This makes miai of enclosing the bottom area on a large scale with C and invading the right side at D. This kind of easy-to-understand strategy is what makes Kato so dangerous.

Cho tries to protect against both these threats with 28. White's ideal development is shown in Dia. 1.

If Black 1, White uses a two-stone sacrifice to set up a sente squeeze. The threat of Black 'a' is no longer so scary. White would switch to E at the top in the figure (Black is strong at the top, so it has precedence over the bottom) and would be doing great.



Dia. 1






Figure 2 (29-62)



Dia. 4: good for White

Figure 2 (29-62). No half-measures

Black 29 is the only way to take White to task for 28. After White 30, Black crosscuts with 31 and 33. An absurd variation now appears in the game.

[Dia. 2 shows the variation the players in the pressroom had expected. Admittedly this is rather conventional for Black, but he keeps sente and can switch to A or B in the figure, so he gets

a reasonable result. The cut at 33 took Kato's fellow professionals by surprise. Their conclusion was that White 1 and 3 in Dia. 3 would have been an adequate response. The continuation to 18 shown here is one possibility. White takes a lot of profit, but Kato seemed to indicate after the game that he could have accepted this result.]


In response to White 34, the only move that would occur to me is Black 1 in Dia. 4. After White 2 and 4, Black invades at 5. However, even though the continuation to 15 after White 6 feels good, the size of the territory White gets up to 18 can't be sneered at. This result looks good for White. If Black uses 7 to fight back with Black 8, the fight looks feasible for Black, but Kato has prepared a severer measure.

Have you ever seen a move like Black 35? White naturally splits Black into two with 36 to 40, whereupon Black plays 47, well aware of his own shortage of liberties. This move really gave me a jolt — this is a hard-boiled view of go. Probably Kato is the only player who could play like this. What's more, the result to 61 is good for Black.

Note that if White compromises by playing 44 at C, Black attaches at 46.

[Black 47 apparently took Cho by surprise. If White answers with 1 in Dia. 5, he gets into trouble; White can't get a ladder by cutting below 4, so he is sealed in. The result is a two-stage ko that is unfavourable for White. If Cho had seen 47 coming, he would probably have followed Dia. 3.

White 52. Capturing two stones as in Dia. 6 would be terrible for White. Black's squeeze makes him too strong at the top.]




The atari of 57 is essential — if Black just connects at 59, he can't expect White to answer at 58 if he cuts at 57 later.

Kato seems to see only the strongest moves.

[White 62. White can't hane at 1 in Dia. 7. The cut Black made earlier lets him force with 4

to 8, so he captures three stones with 10 — if White 'a', Black 'b'.]



Dia. 7: Black wins




Figure 3 (63-73)

Figure 3 (63-73). Kato compromises.


Don't you feel that White is being a little too forceful with 66 to 70? Actually, White has no choice about how he plays. If Black easily breaks through at the top, White will have two weak groups to look after. There is nothing but black stones in the top left and on the right, so the game would be virtually over.

A peaceful sequence is played up to 73. Black is not the same player he was in Figure 2. What's the problem?

Instead of 71, how about playing Black 1 to 7 in *Dia. 8*? White makes a nuisance of himself with 8 to 12. Even if Black resists White 20 with 21, his group at the top is doomed after White 24. It would be nice if Black could play 23 in sente in advance, but there's no way he can get an opportunity to do that.


In that case, what about Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9*? As far as I can see, this spells trouble for

White. If White 4, Black lives unconditionally with 5. Black 9 is the correct answer to White 8. If Black 9 at 'a', White 'b' puts Black on the spot.




Dia. 8

18: takes; 19: retakes



Dia. 9




Dia. 10: Cho's reading

[According to *Go Weekly*, Kato seemed to indicate in the game review that he hadn't given much thought to the cut. However, Cho did and he had prepared a counter. He assumed that if Black cut, he would follow up with 3 in *Dia. 10* (rather than Kamimura's 3 in *Dia. 9*). After the moves to 9, White 10 forces Black 11; if Black does nothing, White reduces him to one eye with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 11. Well and good, but White still has two weak groups. It is here that we see the brilliance of

Cho's analysis. His solution to White's problems is to cap at 12. Next —

Dia. 11. If Black pulls out his stone with 1 and 3, the continuation is inevitable. White loses six stones, but he captures at 32 and invades at 34. Cho assessed this result as playable for White.



*Dia. 11: a reasonable game
ko: 26, 29, 32*

The players who had been following the game were quite impressed when Cho revealed this sequence.]

Black certainly has the easier game when he plays 73, but connecting at 72 gives White a strong shape, enabling him to play aggressively. Sure enough, he promptly commences operations at the bottom.





Figure 4 (74–100)

Figure 4 (74–100). The losing move

Look at 74 and 80: White is raring for a fight.

Black 85 is a clever move. If White answers at 97, Black A works perfectly; if White answers it with B, Black plays C and vice versa.

White 96 is probably the losing move, as White ends in gote up to 104 in the next figure. Instead of 96, he had to block at 97, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 12*. White keeps sente, so he could switch to an invasion of the top left (at 13 in Figure 5). The game would then be up for grabs.



Dia. 12: still a game




Figure 5 (101–125)

Figure 5 (101–125). The game is decided.

White manages to reduce Black's territory with the manoeuvre from 6, but Black builds centre thickness and gets sente to switch to 25. He wouldn't have done nearly as well if White had invaded before he added a reinforcement. This decides the game.

Figure 6 (126–160). Black keeps his lead.

[Black 55. Black A would be more solid, as it defends against the threat of White B. White takes aim at this aji with 56 on, but Black answers carefully. Apparently White catches up a little in the centre fighting, though not enough to make a game of it.]



Kato takes the lead in the series.




Figure 6 (126–160)

Figure 7 (161–203). *Kato goes one up.*

The highlight of this game was the fighting in the top right. If Kato had gone on to win with the same momentum, it would have been a one-sided game. Missing *Dia. 9* is Black's only demerit. The way he wrapped up the game in the second half was close to flawless.

Because I belong to the same age group as Kato, my commentary has perhaps been biased in his favour, so I apologise to Cho U fans. However, isn't it nice to see a player of his age fighting so vigorously?

White resigns after Black 203.

(*Monthly Go World*, August 2003, with reference to the *Mainichi Newspaper* and *Go Weekly*, 16 June 2003)




Figure 7 (161–203)

Game Four: Focus on a cutting point

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho U

Played in Otsu City, Shiga Prefecture on 16 & 17 June 2003.

Commentary by Kamimura Kunio 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takahito.

Figure 1 (1–24). The problem of the cutting point

The first noteworthy move in this game is White 10, which makes miai of A and 12.

Black 13. The sequence in *Dia. 1* is favourable for White — Black's capture is not a ponuki because of the extra stone.

After 15, Black gets a ladder with 19 if White plays at B, but Kato is ready with the ladder-breaker at 16. Black can't afford to answer it — if White cuts at B, Black can't expect to do well in the fight. If Black answers White B by extending at C, White pushes at 19 or 24, and his stone at 10 participates in the fight.





Figure 1 (1–24)



Dia. 1: good for White

The moves to 20 look right. What is the balance sheet? In effect, White has played in three corners; in particular, his successive moves in the top right corner are magnificent. Black would

maintain that the 10–11 exchange has just created a target for Black to attack. Moreover, 19 builds thickness. I suppose you could say the result is equal.

The only thing is that Kato doesn't look upon the bottom left black position as thickness. He attacks with 22 and 24.

What is 24 all about? Simply put, the moment it's played, cutting points at B and C are created. But Kato's real aim is not to cut Black into two but to make him connect at B. We professionals hate most this kind of move, which doesn't take even one point.

Cho's next move is important. How does he respond to the challenge of White 24?






Figure 2 (25–47)



Dia. 2: connecting on dame points

Figure 2 (25–47). To connect or not to connect?

Black 25. If Black 1 and White 2 in *Dia. 2*, Black 3 looks likely. White has achieved his objective, but he has two weak groups. Therefore, let's try White 2 in *Dia. 3*: White leans on the black stone on the side. Black 3 and 5 are the most reasonable response, whereupon White boldly cuts at 6 instead of extending at 'a'. There's no ladder at 'a', so the fight will be favourable for White.




Dia. 3: good for White


Cho plays an ingenious move with 25. If instead he makes the ordinary move of Black 27, White will respond by cutting at 31, and Black will probably be forced to connect at A. Black 25 asserts that whatever happens he's not going to connect there.

White 26 and 28 are resolute moves, just like 24. They hurt the marked stone: White is suffering a loss in advance.

White has no choice about 30. If he cuts with 1 in *Dia. 4*, he can't contain the black stone, so his position is cut to pieces.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

When Black connects at 31, White is faced with a vexing situation. If possible, he would like to seal Black in with 1 in *Dia. 5*. But Black 2 will come flying. White may resist with 3 to 7, but his position will fall apart after 8. He will no longer be able to exploit the cutting point of 'a'.

Kato makes a preparatory manoeuvre with 32. After the exchange to 35, Black's counterattack in *Dia. 5* no longer works. Finally, Black

looks like being forced to make the connection at A that White has been hoping for.




Dia. 6: not the Cho style

Black 35. If Black pokes his head out with 1 in *Dia. 6*, he can ignore the cutting point of 'a'. However, Cho does not like to give the opponent moves like 2 and 4. Letting the opponent take profit and using one's thickness to overhaul him is not a strategy he's fond of.

Does that mean, then, that Black has no choice but to connect at A? Hardly. No professional would docilely make this kind of connection. Kato is being optimistic.

Black 37 is a blow at the vital point. What happens if White uses 38 to connect at 1 in *Dia. 7*? Black 2 and 4 work effectively, enabling him to link up with 6. Black is not afraid of a brute-force attempt to cut him into two with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c': Black 'd' makes miai of 'e' and 'f'.



Dia. 7: Black is safe

After White 38 to 42, the hane-diagonal connection of 43 and 45 is Black's lifeline. In order to secure life in the corner, White can't omit 46. When Black hanes at 47, he doesn't have to connect at B yet. If White continues with either C or D, Black just captures the stone, whichever it is.

The sequence to 47 demonstrates that White 24 in Figure 1 has failed. Kato commented that he regretted it. Does that mean it was a bad

move? No, not so. There are not so many professionals who could propose an alternative plan for 24 on the spot. As for me, I haven't a clue.

Why do I go so easy on Kato? Because the way he fights after this is even more interesting than 24 — even more radical, more powerful.





Figure 3 (48-77)

Figure 3 (48-77). Cho is confident.

White 48 takes considerable profit. If Black played first at A, White couldn't expect to make territory here. White 50 is also natural. If White ignores 49, Black will launch a severe attack with B.


Let's pause after Black 53. This is a large point no one can criticize. If so, then it would be natural for White to want to play in the last large area, at the top. However, Kato plays 54. He waits for 55, then makes the checking extension of 56. The upshot is that Black occupies the bottom right with 57.



Dia. 8: an even game


Instead of 56, the standard strategy would be to limit Black's bottom right territory with 1 in Dia. 8. The continuation to 7 would give an even

game. If Black blocks on the outside with 2 in Dia. 9, White secures corner territory up to 9 and can have no grounds for dissatisfaction.




Dia. 9: White takes territory

Why does Kato content himself with gote like this? Because he is still preoccupied with White 24. With 58 and 60, he launches an attack. His targets are the bottom left and left-side black groups. However, Cho makes a splendid reply.



Dia. 10: Black squeezes



Dia. 11: counterattack


Black 61 is perfectly timed. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 10, Black plays 2 and 4, then squeezes after White 'a' with Black 'b' to 'd'; the cutting point of 'e' disappears as a threat. If instead White plays 1 in Dia. 11, Black has the strong moves of 2 and 4.

White has no choice about 62, which Black can answer with 63. This sets up the sente move

of 67; even after White connects at 64, linking up with C and living with D are miai.

Once again, White has been unable to make any significant gain from his attack. He switches to reducing Black's right-side position, but the fact that he can go in no further than 66 could not be more painful.

For his part, Black is doing fine. He reinforces the top up to 77, which is like an assertion that he has the lead. If Black hasn't played the sequence from 69, then, at the least, he can aim at the ko following 1 to 5 in *Dia. 12*. He's just giving up this aji. If Black plays E after 76, White captures him with F.



Dia. 12: ko





Figure 4 (78-85)




Dia. 13: scary for both sides

Figure 4 (78-85). Cho compromises.

As in the previous figure, Kato's play in this figure shows that he's still preoccupied with the cutting point of A. His play makes me feel that 'go is the aesthetics of fussiness'.

White forces with 78 to 82, then defiantly descends at 84. This is a strong attack; rather, it is a do-or-die move. It looks reckless, as it's surrounded by black stones, but it's surprisingly difficult for Black to find a good way to punish White.

The strongest move for 85 is Black 1 in *Dia. 13*. White has to try to extricate himself. However, I can't find any clearly decisive move for Black after White 4. Instead of 3 —



Dia. 14: trouble for Black

Dia. 14. If Black blocks at 3 here, White cuts at 4, which is sente against the black group on the left. White then cuts at 6: this is big trouble — it's probably the ideal development that Kato depicted in his mind.

Cho's analysis probably agreed with Kato's. With 85, he chooses the most solid move. However, I am most dissatisfied with this. There are two reasons.

The first: in the result after this, there is a major upset. Not to be able to hang on to your lead after compromising with 85: it's an unthinkable blunder.

The second: why didn't Cho read the continuation after 1 in *Dia. 13*, or, more specifically, after 4, more deeply? Players who earn a place in go history wouldn't abandon their analysis of a problem like this halfway. Honinbo Jowa would probably have read it out right to the end; Cho Chikun would have kept reading until his time ran out.

One often sees a tendency among young players these days to look for the quickest path to victory. It saddens me to see this. I would like them to believe in themselves more. How about it?






Figure 5 (86-104)

Figure 5 (86-104). A success for White

The timing of White 86 is perfect. Up to 104, White settles his group with nearly ten points of territory, though in gote. Black has also captured two stones, but, if you look at the original position, it's clear at a glance who has profited.



Dia. 15: better for White?



Dia. 16: White's counterattack

However, go players are greedy. Kato apparently expressed regrets later about not playing 94 at 1 in Dia. 15. It's true that this way he can avoid giving Black the capture in the game. However, there are not only pluses. Black gets a

strong move: the contact play of 4. If White answers at 'a', Black 'b' makes miai of 'c' and 'd'.

That being so, how about playing Black 95 at 1 in Dia. 16? This time White has a way to resist. White 2 is a clever move, as it makes White 4 possible. The gain from filling in a liberty of the corner black group becomes apparent with White 10 to 16. White 'a' and attacking the eye shape of the corner group are miai.




Figure 6 (105-154)

Figure 6 (105-154). Kato and Cho both miss opportunities to wrap up the game.

Kato's preoccupation with the bottom left that started with 24 in Figure 1 has finally paid off on his third challenge (attack). White has taken profit while destroying Black's bottom right area, so he is clearly ahead. Cho pins his hopes of an upset on an attack on the left-side white group. It's strange how all the important points in this game relate to the bottom left.


Black severs the connection between White's left-side group and his group at the top with 5 to 9. However, take a closer look. Black's own shape here is nothing to boast about.

This was an ideal opportunity for White to decide the game. He just has to block at 1 in Dia. 17. If White secures this much territory at the top, Black's only hope will be capturing the white group below.


If Black 2, White attaches at 3. How about it? It's simple. After 4, White makes an eye, sente all the way, up to 13, then switches back to the centre to make another eye at 15. White lives without hurting any of his other positions.

In that case, how about using 4 to counterattack at 4 in Dia. 18? White is ready with the 5-7

combination. White 1 has made the corner thick, so White can aim at pushing through at 'a', then cutting. He can also pull out his centre stone with 'b', so capturing this group is probably impossible.



Dia. 17: wrapping up the game




Dia. 18: White prevails

In the game, White reinforces in the centre with 10 to 14, but even then he is not completely alive, which is a big drawback. And not using 22 to make a throw-in at A, forcing Black B, is a grave sin of omission. Black takes profit in sente up to 23, then drives a wedge between two white groups with 27. White's position is becoming unraveled.

Having his stones on the right swallowed up would be unbearable, so White has no choice but to flee with 28. Whereupon Black plays 29 and


31. White no longer has even a sente eye on the side. After White C and Black D, White E won't be sente — all because White failed to play 22 at A.



Dia. 19: Black's chance

White is on the point of collapse. White 42 is very painful. If Black played 43 at 1 in *Dia. 19*, the game would be over. After 7, White can't live on the left.

Black 43 looks like a tesuji, but it ends up giving White a chance. Black plays 51 in the expectation that it will be the clincher, only to see White respond with the clever counter of 52.



Dia. 20: what White wants

Black 53. Black 1 in *Dia. 20* is what White wants. White can tenuki after Black captures two stones with 5 and 7. White takes profit with 8 and 10 and is confident he's ahead. Black 'a' is answered by the atari of White 'b'.

Black 53 is the natural counter. However, extending at 54 makes the game promising for White.





Figure 7 (155-200)
72: captures two stones



Dia. 21: a win for White

Figure 7 (155-200). *Kato throws it away.*

In reply to 57, White seals Black in up to 62. The game is completely on course for a win by White. Both White 66 and 68 are tesujis — one more move and the game should be a win for White.

The atari of 70 is a major blunder. It's rare to see a move that can so definitely be labelled the losing move. The black group at the top is alive as it stands. Black switches to 71, capturing two stones, and the game is decided.

If White had played 1 in *Dia. 21*, he could have set up the capture of the two marked black stones and kept sente. Black has no choice but to secure his eye shape with 2 and 4. White

switches to 5 and 7, and the black group can't survive. If Black 8 and 10, White 11 is just right.

Black could ignore White 5 in the diagram in favour of rescuing the larger part of the group, but if White captures its tail end with 6, he takes the lead.




Figure 8 (201-223)

Figure 8 (201-223). *Cho ties the score.*

I hope my readers enjoyed this game. Just looking at the moves, there's no way to tell who's the younger player.

The series is now down to a best-of-three.

White resigns after Black 223.

(*Monthly Go World*, August 2003)



Game Five: An unwinnable ko

White: Cho U

Black: Kato Masao

Played at the Suimeikan Inn, Gero Hot Spring, Gifu Prefecture on 25 & 26 June 2003.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, with reference to the Mainichi Newspaper (given in parentheses).





Figure 1 (1-31)



Dia. 1: the usual strategy

Figure 1 (1-31). A reasonable start for Black

Kato plays one of his favourite openings with 1 and 3. Cho lets him make two enclosures.

Black 9. Black could also split open the bottom with A, but he's in more of a hurry to play on the right side. White 10 is worthy of note. The

first move that comes to mind is White 1 in *Dia. 1*. The continuation to 5 is likely.

Ishida: 'Black and White both get settled positions in this diagram. White 10 in the game is a kind of makeshift move. Cho's strategy is to make do with this one move, instead of an extension, and to give priority to the bottom right corner.'


Black plays 13 to help him settle the stone below. Note that he can't attack with 15 at B, as White gets a ladder with C to E. On the other hand, if White cuts across the knight's move with 18 at F, Black parries him with G — in short, attacking doesn't work well for either side. However, Black H is a real threat after 19, so White plays tightly with 20.

[White 22. If possible, White would like to play at I at the bottom, but then Black is bound to attack at H.]

Ishida: 'Black is satisfied with the result to 23. Though White has stored up strength with 18 and 20, it has no effect on Black, as his groups on the right and on the left at the top are both solid. That being so, one wonders if White shouldn't have omitted 18 and 20, simply playing a probe at 22 instead.'

Since Black has stabilized his group with 23, White can't omit the reinforcement at 24.


When White makes the pincer of 26, the continuation of 27 and 29 seems to work perfectly for Black. However, Ishida had reservations about 27.




Dia. 2: Ishida's suggestion

Ishida: 'How about invading the corner with 1 in *Dia. 2*? It's difficult to say which side White should block on, but if he blocks at 1, the sequence to 15 can be expected. The black group on the bottom right gets a solid shape, and Black also has the lead in territory. If White blocks on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 3* (next page), the moves to 5 follow. If White next plays 'a' through Black 'f', this fight is favourable for Black.'

Black's attack seemed to be going well in the figure, but Ishida had doubts. 'Black blockades from the centre with 29, but then attacks from below with 31 — his stones are not meshing with each other. If I were playing, I would consider *Dia. 4*. [But even after 5] White can aim at the cutting point of 'a', so Black will be uneasy. That's the reason why I suggest using 27 to invade at the 3-3 point.'



Dia. 3: Black can fight



Dia. 4: a cutting point remains




Figure 2 (32-82)
66: connects

Figure 2 (32-82). *Black's attack goes nowhere.*


Black challenges White to a fight with 39 and 43. Ishida: 'The sequence is long, but the moves to 82 look like an inevitable flow. If you look at

the resulting position, Black is actually quite weak, even though he was the one who started the fight. Black was not strong enough to attack the bottom white group.'

[Black pulls out his single stone with 45 and 47 to set up 11 in Figure 4.


Black 55 is a leaning attack: Black's real target is the centre bottom white group. Black builds thickness to 67, but he also helps White to solidify his side position, so Black is paying a price to continue his attack.

Black 63. Black would like to follow the proverb and increase the sacrifice to two stones with 1 in *Dia. 5*, but White counters with 2 and 4, and Black has no follow-up.



Dia. 5: the proverb doesn't apply

Black 77. The sealed move. So far in this series, the side making the sealed move had lost each game. After the game, Kato wondered if he should have played the more territorial move of 1 in *Dia. 6*. That would stop White from laying waste to the top with 82, but 77 to 81 make Black thick in the centre — no conclusion was reached in the game review.]



Dia. 6: going for territory

Figure 3 (83-100). *White takes the lead.*

Black presses White hard with 83 and 85. If Black played the latter move at 87, White would attach at 97 and be more or less out of trouble. Having lost points on the left side with 55 to 67 in the previous figure, Black can't let White settle this group too easily.

[Black 89 was Kato's slowest move of the

game: 89 minutes. It's the only move, so he must have been analysing the continuations.]





Figure 3 (83-100)

Cho ignores his opponent and defends the bottom left corner with 90. [In the pressroom, Hane Naoki maintained that, whatever happened, Cho would play here. If he timidly defended against 89, Black would invade at the 3-3 point, and White's lead would disappear.]

[In this game, White has twice defended territory — with 34 in Figure 2 and now with 90 here — and let Black attack. He is following a thoroughgoing *amashi* policy, in which you let the opponent attack but edge him territorially. If Black

Black doesn't score a success with his attack, he will lose, but it's hard to take profit through an attack on a single group. Black has to try to devise a double attack; the obvious weak points to aim at are A and B.

Dia. 7. If Black descends at 1, White has to play at 2 to stop him from connecting up with 'a'. Black continues by attacking his eye shape with 3 and 5. If he plays 3 at this stage of the game, however, White can switch 4 to 'b' or 'c', so this attack doesn't work out.



Dia. 7: premature

Dia. 8: Black lives but —

Dia. 8. If Black invades at 1, the continuation here is one possibility. Black lives in the corner, but after 10 he has to add a move at 'a'. That gives White time to look after his centre group.

Since neither of these diagrams is good enough, Black attacks the large group with 91. However, provoking White 94 is a miscalculation: the presence of this stone makes 'b' in *Dia. 7* work even better.]



Analysing the game in the pressroom are Hane Naoki, Peter Mioch of Holland, Hane Yasumasa, the referee, and Kudo Norio.





Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 9: ko

Figure 4 (101-150). White defies Black to start the ko.

White rips off three stones up to 8, securing one eye, even though it is the three-stone *nakade* shape.


Black still has his eyes on the white groups in the centre and on the right, but he plays 11 and 13 in an attempt to maintain territorial balance. [According to the *Mainichi*, some professionals in Tokyo (unidentified) queried Black 11, maintaining that Black 20 would have been bigger. This move ensures the capture of another stone, linking up the black groups, and so makes Black A a real threat. White 14 indirectly defends the corner.]

[Responding to Black 19 with White 20 shows resolution and profound analysis. White's

large group doesn't have two eyes after 22 and 24.

Dia. 9. If Black descends at 1, White has to resort to a ko for his second eye. If he hadn't exchanged 20 for 21 in the figure, he could make an eye with 6 to 14. This is not an oversight by Cho, of course. White 20 is big; moreover, it is in effect a declaration that White can win a ko fight.]

The focus of the game at this stage is the left side: who will play there first? It turns out to be White: he extends to 30, ignoring the unsettled state of his large group and the weakness of his top right group. When Black descends at 31, White counters with 32 [one of the moves referred to in *Dia. 7*].



Dia. 10: Black falls into a trap

White has no trouble living up to 46. The last move in particular is clever. Ishida: 'If Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White will immediately play at 2. Black can't ignore it, as White threatens to start a ko with 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. After Black adds a move, White secures a perfect eye with 'd' (which incidentally sets up a good endgame move at 'e'). Black therefore reluctantly plays at 49, but thanks to White 50 —

Figure 5 (151-200). The game is decided.

'White is able to exchange 58 for 59, so when Black attacks his eye shape at the top he is able to set up a two-stage ko. If even a direct ko was of dubious value for Black, then with a two-stage ko there is hardly any need for White to worry about losing his group.'

Black starts the ko with 61 because there's nothing else to do, but he's far from happy about it. White has plenty of adjacent ko threats, and provoking 62 gives White the endgame move of 84. It instead of 61 Black played ordinary endgame, the biggest move is 1 in *Dia. 11*. Ishida: 'The sequence to 18 is standard endgame. However, this way it's clear that Black can't even win

on the board. Black seems to profit a little by starting the ko, but not enough.'





Figure 5 (151-200)
ko: 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 90;
92: connects (at 65)



Dia. 11: Black loses

[Black 73 is necessary. If instead Black takes the ko with 1 in Dia. 12, White plays 2; Black has to play 3 to destroy the eye, but then White 4 and 6 make miai of 'a' and 'b'. This game really bears out the proverb, 'big groups don't die'. Kato's failure to set up a real double attack was undoubtedly one factor in his loss.]

Figure 6 (201-260). Cho goes one up.


Ishida: 'I think the game would have been promising for Black if he had used 27 in Figure 1 to invade at the 3-3 point. I wonder if I'm right.

Kato likes fighting, but in this game his style worked against him. But I'm sure he'll fight even harder in the rest of the series.'

White wins by 5½ points.

(Monthly Go World, August 2003 and the Mainichi Newspaper.)

The fifth game was significant not only for the fact that Cho took the lead for the first time in the series but also because it was the first win by White. However, Cho had also taken a 3-2 lead over O Meien in his first Honinbo challenge, then lost, a bitter experience he would be determined not to repeat.



Dia. 12: another trap




Figure 6 (201-260)



Both players are scratching their heads, but, perplexed though he may seem, it is Cho who takes the lead.

Game Six: An upset secures the title

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho U

Played at the Kameyama Ryo Hotel on 10 & 11 July 2003.

Commentary by Cho U. Report by Kawakuma Hiroyuki (who wrote the interpolated passages in italics).




Figure 1 (1–44)

Figure 1 (1–44). Cho's miscalculation

I have had the good luck to win the Honinbo title. At present, I am quietly savouring the pleasure of taking a big title. As you will see

from this game, my go is still immature. I plan to study more and more so that I can acquire the real strength of a titleholder. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank all the fans who have supported me.

I had a lot of bad games in this series. However, I really played my hardest each time. There are many moves I regret, and in all respects Kato Sensei is a better player than I. I learnt a lot from playing him, just as I did from challenging O Meien two years ago.

As Cho points out in his commentary, he got off to a bad start in this game. He seized victory after a back-to-the-wall struggle.


This is the third appearance in this series of the 'facing 3–4 points' fuseki of 1 and 3. Cho seems fond of the opening to 5.

I often tenuki against the large-knight's approach move of 6. I used to play the joseki of Black 29–White A, but rarely do so now. Hardly anyone plays it these days. In response to the pincer of 8, Black 9 is a move I've wanted to try. I was curious to see what would happen.

Kato's response with 10 to 26 filled me with admiration. You shouldn't be admiring your opponent in a contest, but I considered this series an opportunity to study.

Cho commented that if White had played 10 at 1 in Dia. 1, he planned to counter with 2 and 4. If instead White 1 at 4, then Black 1. If a fight

starts, the marked black stone will make its presence felt. When White simply takes up position with 10, it's a little difficult to set this stone in motion.



Dia. 1: Black welcomes a fight

When White plays 10, one wants to play a splitting move at 11. The continuation to 17 is just a commonsense sequence. White blocks just once at 18, then caps at 20. It's a bit early in the game to be saying this, but, to be honest, I was floored. I answered straightforwardly with 21 to 25, but the defensive move of 26 was a splendid move. Backing up and reinforcing like this shows marvellous judgement.


If White answers 19 directly, B or C is the move. Switching elsewhere after just the one move at 18 is often seen: it's a way of keeping one's options open. White will choose between B and C after seeing how the game develops. After White 26, the black group has poor eye shape. That's not an immediate problem, but it's something Black has to bear in mind.

I hastened to extend to 27, but in the sequence from 28 I clearly damaged my position in the corner. Looking back, perhaps I should have used 17 to extend at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White 2, Black then invades at 3. The only thing is that White might attach at 'a' instead of 2. However, he'll probably play 2, as he doesn't yet have a stone at 'b'.


To give the conclusion, Black seems to have had no choice but to play 27 at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If White 2, Black plays 'a' or 'b'. I expected 28 in the game and 29 was the answer I had planned, but this was bad.

If you change the order of the moves in the figure, it's the same as if Black has answered White 2 with 3 to 7 in *Dia. 4*. In the game,

there's a white stone at 'a'. Cho thought that this stone had become a bad move. However, White has a way of making good use of it, with 44 in the figure, which is where Cho miscalculated.




Dia. 2: changing the timing




Dia. 3: better for Black

Note that if Black uses 31 to follow *Dia. 5*, White contrives a double attack on the two stones on the side and the group below. This won't appeal to Black at all.



Dia. 4: Cho's analysis



Dia. 5: double attack





Figure 2 (45-78)




Dia. 6: an improvement

Figure 2 (45-78). Things don't get better.

The result to 58 is not what I had expected at the top. The opponent may have scored a success at an early stage of the game [at the bottom], but my play in the top left corner was much too facile. The only thing is that I was pleased that I got a chance to play 59. I was startled when White attached at 60. When White lives quickly here, Black's result is hopeless. After White turns at 70, he has lived in sente, as he has a reserve eye at A. This is stylish. Black may break through on the left side up to 77, but that's nothing to boast about. On the contrary, the black group doesn't have eyes, so there's even a danger that White will make a double attack on it and the group at the bottom.

Looking back, perhaps I should have at least tried playing 57 at 1 in Dia. 6. After waiting for White to move out with 2 to 6, Black forces with 7; turning at 9 then feels good. If White plays 2 at 9 as in the game, Black doesn't play 7 but instead extends to 8. Of course, I'm not confident that White will docilely answer 7 at 8 anyway.



Dia. 7: brute force

Dia. 8: sacrifice

The players on the spot researched the forceful attack of 61 at 1 in Dia. 7. White 2 in response is a tesuji for sabaki (settling oneself). If Black 3 at 'a', White plays 'b'. Next —

Dia. 8. The atari of 1 is the only move White has. Black can now cut at 2. However, White sacrifices seven stones, and you can't say that Black has done well. Apparently, Black has no choice about the sequence from 63 in the game.





Figure 3 (79-100)

Figure 3 (79-100). White is ahead.

The battlefront now shifted to the right side. The sequence from 82 to 88 was quite natural. One can feel Kato Honinbo's confidence. Black 89 was badly received.

To be honest, I was at a loss as to what to play for 89. I was aware that 1 in *Dia. 9* was the proper move. However, White strengthens himself with 2 to 8, and the position is hopeless for Black. The territory White secures with 2 on is not to be sneezed at. Well, usually it would be nothing special, but in this game it would be enough for White. If Black plays 89, White passes a move, and Black plays 1 in *Dia. 9*, then it will be a good game. That's how bad things already are for Black. You can see why I was at a loss for a move.

The moves from 93 are a last resort. Black secures the corner profit, but he's hurt the marked stone. Kato commented that Black 95 perhaps should have been at 1 in *Dia. 10*.




Dia. 9: proper move Dia. 10: correct play

This diagram was the first variation I thought of. The only thing is that when Black attaches like this, the exchange of the marked stones makes the white stone a forcing move. That would have been too galling.

White also slips up with 96. He should have forced with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 11*. If he later plays B in the game, Black extends at C.

Figure 4 (101–114). Hoping for a chance

The position is hopeless for Black. The prospect of a seventh game flashed across my brain. All I can do is play my hardest in the final game, I thought. Moreover, it was still the first day of the game. What would I do if I couldn't even make it to the second day? I thought of the trouble this would cause everyone.



Dia. 11: omission

Dia. 12: trouble




Figure 4 (101–114)

We were astonished when Black started operations deep inside White's territory with 3 to 7. White 12 was the sealed move. [The jinx held to the last: the player making the sealed move lost every game.]

What do you do when the game is really bad for you? I wait for a chance, trying to take profit little by little and throwing in an occasional do-or-die move. I had gone all-out for territory in the top and bottom right corners. Black 5 and 7 were light do-or-die moves. By this I mean that I didn't have my heart set on saving all my stones.

If White plays 6 at 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black tries to exploit the defects in his position with 2 and 4. Black also has the aji of Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c'. The player who's ahead won't relish

this kind of development.

For that reason, Kato regretted not exchanging White 3 for Black 'd' in Dia. 12 (page 47) before connecting with the marked stone. In that case, Black 2 wouldn't be sente. Black therefore wouldn't have been able to play 5 in the figure.





Figure 5 (114-150) (14 repeated)
41: ko



Dia. 13: not White's preference


Figure 5 (114-150). Black pulls out his group.

The sealed move of 14 makes White thick. If instead White plays at 1 in Dia. 13, Black has no choice but to scurry for safety with 2 and 4. In this variation, the bottom white group remains unsettled, so this is not the way the player with the lead will want to play.


With 15, Black tries to use a leaning attack to settle himself. If White counters with 1 in Dia. 14, Black will discard three stones. White wants to attack on a large scale, so 16 is natural. White is leaning on Black in order to attack.

Black 19 seeks to build momentum in order to settle the group. White 20 in response is natu-

ral, but a good move nonetheless. Playing 21 at 1 in Dia. 15 would be too heavy. With 4, White gets a double attack going. If Black 'a', White dodges to 'b'. I believed that 21 and 23 were the only moves.




Dia. 14: discarding the tail



Dia. 15: double attack

Black boldly permits White to cut at 24. Up to 47, he links up his group. If White plays 24 at 1 in Dia. 16, Black cuts at 4, and the marked white stones can't be saved.



Dia. 16: unreasonable for White

Kato Sensei regretted after the game that at some stage, for example, with 20, he didn't make the exchange from White 'a' to Black 'd' in *Dia. 16*. In this case, Black wouldn't have been able to link up with 31, so the game would have developed in a completely different way.





Figure 6 (151-169)



Dia. 17: good for White

Figure 6 (151-169). White misses his chance.

Although Black's right-side group has linked up, his centre group is in pieces. Moreover, the group extending from the right is still thin. Black may have closed the gap a little, but he still has a lot of fighting ahead of him. I thought that cutting with 51 was the only way to seek *sabaki*.


As we see later, 65 becomes Black's privilege: White has no choice but to link up with 66 and 68. Black has not only laid waste to the right side but has also secured an option on more profit with A, so it's certainly true that Black has a chance now. In contrast, there's a burden on White's attack now. With Black having taken so

much profit, White has to obtain some gains himself. However, Black does seem to be in real trouble after White attacks with 48 in the previous figure.

Let's review what's happened. Black discarded six stones on the left side. In compensation, he got cuts at B and C. I left these for later, and started out by invading the 3-3 point with 69. Putting aside the question of whether Black had already actually upset White's lead, at a minimum you can say that the atmosphere was that of an upset. There'd be nothing strange about it now if Black won a game that had been really good for White.

This is the decisive figure. There were various alternatives for Black, but because of limitations of space I'll discuss just one move by White.

The peep of 1 in *Dia. 17* would have been better than 52. If Black 2, White plays 3, and Black can't capture the marked stone. In that case, the black group on the left is still eyeless, and the five black stones to the right in the centre are scattered. This variation would probably be no good for Black.




Dia. 18: a probable win for White

Black has no choice but to answer 1 by pushing down with 2 in *Dia. 18*. White counters with 3 to 7 and captures the left-side black group on a larger scale than in the game. There's a *but*, however. This is not the end of the story. Next —

Dia. 19. Black can continue with 1 and 3. White can't afford to lose the centre, so he tries to escape with 4 and 6, but then some black stones come back to life with 5 and 7. If White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', which is no good for White. Later, Black can cause trouble at the top with 'e' or 'f'. This variation would have


been better for White than what happened in the game, but there are still some difficult elements.



Dia. 19: a difficult game

Black's being able to invade comfortably at 69 is significant. It's possible thanks to the connection between his right-side and bottom groups. Before that, in Figure 5, for example, White D would have been virtually sente against the black group at the centre bottom. Black couldn't have lightheartedly invaded at 69.

Incidentally, if White attacks in the centre with 1 in Dia. 20, Black can live with 2 on. Counterattacking with 2 at 'a' would also be a good strategy.



Dia. 20: Black lives

Figure 7 (170–200). The losing move

Kato Sensei mishandled my 3–3 invasion. You have to say that my result was much better than I had any right to expect.

First of all, White 72 is a blunder. White must push through with 1 in Dia. 21 before connecting. Blocking at 9 in sente is big; after 12,

White could switch to A on the top right in the figure. This way the lead would still be unclear.







Figure 7 (170–200)



Dia. 21: correct



Dia. 22: White loses



Dia. 23: correct

Being able to live by connecting at 73 was big. If White attacks with 74 at 1 in Dia. 22, Black plays 2, then blocks at 4. He doesn't have two eyes after 5, but Black 8 is sente, so he starts a capturing race with 10. White can't win this fight. If White plays 3 at 4, Black can hane out at 3. I hadn't expected that my discarded six stones would do so much work.

White 80 was a hallucination on Kato's part that widened the gap. Black had a comfortable lead, so he played the endgame tightly after this. White 80 had to be the cut at 1 in Dia. 23. The



Reviewing the game with Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. Cho U became the third member of the 'big four' of the younger generation (the others are Yamashita Kisei, Takao Shinji, who challenged for the Judan title, and Hane Naoki Tengen) to win a title. At 23, he was the second-youngest tournament Honinbo.

exchange for 2 stops Black from playing 'a' and lets White switch to A in the figure.

Although Dia. 23 represents best play for White, the game was apparently already unwinnable for him, even though the margin was slight. White 52 (Figure 6) was a factor in White's loss; the actual losing move was White 72.




Figure 8 (201-251)

ko: 37, 40, 43, 46, 49




Figure 9 (251-300)

ko: 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97; 99: connects (at 52)

Figures 8, 9, 10. Debut of a new star

I was quite relieved to win this game when at one point I was resigning myself to playing a seventh game. Earlier this year Yamashita took the Kisei title, so I felt that I had to pull off something, too. The only thing is that, as I mentioned at the beginning, I have a long way to go

in playing strength. I'm going to play every game with all my might, just as I've done up to now.

Black wins by 9½ points

(*Monthly Go World*, September 2003. Honinbo report translated by John Power.)




Figure 10 (301–335)

12: retakes; 33: ko; 35: connects



Kato was unable to extend his record as the oldest holder of the Honinbo title.

The 28th Meijin Title Match

Yoda Norimoto Meijin vs. Yamashita Keigo Kisei

This year's Meijin title match was expected to be the highlight of the tournament year, as it pitted the two top titleholders, the Kisei and the Meijin, against each other. Yamashita had established himself as the number one player at the beginning of the year when he won the Kisei title from O Rissei and he had won the Meijin league with a perfect 8–0 score. It may seem only natural that the Kisei should be the Meijin challenger, but this was only the third time it had happened. In 1988, Kobayashi Koichi Kisei challenged Kato Masao for the Meijin title and won it; in 1996, Cho Chikun Kisei challenged Takemiya Masaki Meijin and took the title from him. These were both good precedents for Yamashita, but on the other hand there was a jinx: a perfect score had been recorded three times previously in the Meijin league and each time the player concerned had failed in his challenge for the title. Of course, no one takes serious notice of precedents like these.

Least of all, Yoda Norimoto. He was enjoying great form and had just won the Gosei title. His record so far in the year was 27 wins to 12 losses. After he rebuffed Cho Chikun's Meijin challenge 4–1 last year, there was general agreement among the go pundits that he had the potential to become one of the great Meijins. One criterion for that would be qualifying for the title of Honorary Meijin by winning the title for five years in a row. Defeating Yamashita would put him within reach of that target.

Game One

Outmanoeuvred in the centre

White: Yamashita Keigo Kisei

Black: Yoda Norimoto Meijin

Played at the Station Hotel Kokura, Kokura, Kita-Kyushu City on 10 & 11 September 2003.

Komi: 6½; time: 8 hours each.

Commentary by O Meien Oza.





Figure 1 (1-44)
22: ko (at 8); 26, 28: connect



Dia. 1: the popular variation

Figure 1 (1-44). The 'Otake joseki'


White 6 at 37 would be the Kato style.

White 12 is the first turning point. In recent years, the joseki in *Dia. 1* has been popular. After 5, Black jumps to 'a' or attaches at 'b'. Instead, Yamashita goes for outside thickness with the old version of the joseki, which is rarely seen these days. Otake: 'In the old days, I slipped up many times with this joseki. I'm happy to see Yamashita play it.'

Black 23 brings us to the second turning point: instead of capturing at 24, White can also extend at 25. Yamashita must have studied this joseki — he thought for just four minutes about 24, and the continuation to 32 was played in a flash. Someone in the pressroom commented: 'It's the Otake joseki.' It appeared a couple of times in the Meijin title matches between Otake and Kobayashi [Game 5 of the 15th Meijin title in 1990 (see *Go World* 62) and Game 5 of the 17th Meijin title in 1992 (see *Tournament Go* 1992)]. White's winning percentage was not good, and some people claimed that it couldn't be called a joseki. But Otake kept playing it.



Yoda and Yamashita at the party on the eve of the first game. Both received bouquets and here Yoda is making his speech.



Dia. 2: variation

Otake: 'I knew it was bad, but when I was playing I'd forget and find I'd played it again. Even so, I don't know if it's really bad. I'm glad if Yamashita Kisei has reevaluated it. The increase in the komi to 6½ might be a factor.'

If White wants to avoid the 'Otake joseki', he can play 24 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. The continuation to 6 is pretty well inevitable. White gets sente, so he can press at 7. White seems to be doing well.


The professionals in the pressroom expected this line, but Yamashita chose the basic pattern of the old joseki. This cedes the good point of 33 to Black, but White attempts to seize the initiative by pressing at 34.

Connecting at 39 avoids the complicated versions of the taisha joseki — it shows respect for White's thickness lying in wait at the top. If Black played the basic pattern, connecting at 1 in *Dia. 3* (next page), his two stones on top would have to flee towards this thickness. The precondition for 39 is that the ladder at 43 be favourable for Black.

Up to 44, the play has followed joseki, but Yoda sank into thought on his next move. 'What on earth could he be thinking about?' wondered the players in the pressroom.



Conducting the nigiri to decide colours. Yoda always wears traditional Japanese dress (haori coat and hakama trousers) in title matches.



Dia. 3: what White wants





Figure 2 (44-72) (44 repeated)


Figure 2 (44-72). Surprises from Yoda

After 44, capturing at A is the joseki, but, after 43 minutes' thought, Yoda played at 45. This move bears out the saying, 'there are no josekis for Meijins'. It met with lavish praise. On satellite TV, O Meien said: 'It's a new move. It's magnificent. It was worth coming to Kokura just

to see this move. White doesn't have a severe ladder-breaker in the top right [thanks to Black's tight move at 33 in Figure 1], so Black is saying that he's under no obligation to capture at A.'



Dia. 4: better for White



Dia. 5: expected

Yamashita in turn thought for 55 minutes, then switched to 46, a move that perhaps shows that he couldn't come up with any good answer to 45 (White B would be too slow). After the game, he commented: 'Perhaps I should have played 44 at 1 in Dia. 4. If Black 2 and White 3, I wouldn't have had such a bad time of it.' Black will probably extend to 4, aiming at invading at 5, but White could well invest a move at 5. This way, the aji of the marked stone would not be so ominous.

Black 47 is severe. Contrary to expectations, Yoda is the one attacking and Yamashita the one defending. Yamashita also has to play low with 50, which is not usually to his liking.


Black 53 was queried by the players following the game, who thought that 1 in Dia. 5 was best. If 3, White can link up with 4 and 6, but, if Black cuts at 'a', White has to answer at 'b'. That means that Black can build overwhelming thickness in sente with 'c' and 'd'.

However, Yoda was following a different strategy. Black 53 sets up the placement of 57, which in turn makes 61 sente. If White omits 62, Black can get the ko shown in Dia. 6. Instead of 8 —

Dia. 7. If White 8 here, Black makes a throw-in at 9, then wins the fight outright with 11: one eye vs. no eye.

The result to 62 is a success for Black. Yamashita: 'The sente sequence played against my

corner was awful — the game was hopeless for me.'



Yoda had a much bigger surprise for everyone: after cleverly manoeuvring with 47 to 51, he now proceeded to discard these stones, starting with 63.

O Meien: 'The world is wide, but probably only Yoda could play like this. Anyone would be astonished. If Black exchanged C for White D, then secured his ladder with a move around 67, he would seem to have no grounds for dissatisfaction.'

White 64 is a good answer to 63. After 65 and 66, Black 67 is necessary to stop White from playing A, so White gets the good hane at 68. White seems to have done well locally, but actually this is all according to Yoda's plan. He has calculated that he can take enough territory to win.

Black 69 is the only move — Black finally answers White's approach move.

White 70 was queried by O. 'White should expand his moyo with E, bluffing that he can capture the four black stones without playing a stone at 72.' White 72 was the sealed move.

Figure 3 (73–100). Avoiding complications

Black 73 is an efficient forcing move that proves its value later.

Black 75 also surprised Yoda's fellow professionals. O: 'An ordinary player would probably invade at 1 in Dia. 8. Black splits White into two, so he should be able to handle this fight. But Yoda Meijin wants to avoid a fight with unclear prospects. The aim of 75 is not to give the opponent any scope to create complications.'

Black 77 represents another chance to invade at 96 but Yoda is not interested. At this point, the players in the pressroom thought that the game was even, but Yoda knew better. He was intent on closing down the game, as he was convinced he had the lead.

Black 87 is a good move. Otake surmised that Yamashita probably hadn't expected Yoda

to tenuki at the top. He also expressed dissatisfaction with Yamashita's response at 88, as it let Black settle the shape with 89. He advocated holding back at 1 in Dia. 9. This move aims at 'a', so Black will probably defend at 2. White can exchange 3 for 4, then switch to 5, which seems to make the game quite close.





Figure 3 (73–100)



White 98 looks a little deep — the professionals in the pressroom seemed to think that it was even a bit of an overplay. However, Black answers peacefully with 99. Once again, Yoda avoids unnecessary fighting.

Yoda is known for his optimism in positional judgement, but on the other hand the actual player has a better feel for the state of a game than an onlooker.






Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 10: walling off the centre



Dia. 11: not how Yoda planned it

Figure 4 (101-150). Yoda's clarity of vision

White 4 is a strange move — A is superior.

Giving way with 6 to 12 is painful, but, if White resists with 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black forces with 2 and 4, which is even more painful.

Black continues to simplify with 13 and 15 and 17-21.

Black 23, worth 15 points in gote, is the last large endgame point.

White 26. If at B, Black cuts at 35.

Black 27 was Yoda's slowest move of the game (49 minutes). He confirmed to his own

satisfaction that he was ten points ahead on the board.

One reason why the players in the press-room thought that the game was close was that they overlooked 35 and 37. They expected Black 1 in *Dia. 11*.

Dia. 11. Black 1 is the point that naturally attracts the eye. The reason is that if White blocks at 'a' Black can pincer at 'b'. However, White 2 and 4 are bigger. The theory that the margin on the board was less than ten points was based on this diagram.

O: 'Only Yoda Meijin was aware of how big 35 and 37 were. If you factor in the expansion in Black's territory from turning at C, the difference from 2 and 4 in the diagram easily exceeds ten points. I don't know whether we should praise the Meijin's precision or be ashamed of our blindness.'




Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200). A safe win

[There are no comments on this figure.]

Figure 6 (201-249). The formidable Yoda

White 34 loses a point, as White doesn't have the ko threats to fight a ko.

Note that A is a dame point. The Japanese go aesthetic is for neither side to play this kind of point [during the competitive part of the game — of course, it is filled in with the other dame, but it is not included in the game record].

This was a convincing win for Yoda. His strategy with 47 in Figure 2 was superb — he scored a success when he blocked at 61 in sente. Then his bold sacrifice with 63 was the

highlight of the game. All in all, he was looking very formidable.

Black wins by 7½ points.

(Adapted from the *Asahi Newspaper* by John Power.)




Figure 6 (201-249)

ko: 38, 41, 44, 47; 49: connects

The remaining games from the title match will be given in our next issue.

9th Women's Kusu Title Game Two

This is the entertaining game with which Cho Hye-yeon won her first Women's Kusu title. Only a very brief commentary is available to us.

White: Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Cho Hye-yeon 4-dan (Korea)

Played in Seoul on 11 November 2003.

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each.

Commentary by Kim In 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). Black A would be better for 27. The development to 30 is not favourable for Black.

Figure 2 (51-100). White 72 is a tesuji. White gets a good game when she easily settles her stones up to 88.

Figure 3 (101-150). White 2. Better to attack with White 10-Black 11-White 5. Black's superb sabaki up to 25 puts her back in the game.

White 30 is dubious: it should be around 37.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

85: connects




Figure 3 (101-150)

25: connects




Figure 4 (151-200)
65: ko (at 59)




Figure 5 (201-240)
16: ko; 18: connects

Figure 4 (151-200)

Up to 53, Black lays waste to the top in sente. She follows that up with the clever sequence from 55 to 61 in the bottom left, then switches to 67. The lead has changed hands.

By 95, Black has built a definite lead.

Figure 5 (201-240)

The final margin would have been bigger if Black had played 1 at A, making miai of 1 and B.

Figure 6 (241-282)

As this game shows, Cho has plenty of fighting prowess. There's a lot of competition in women's go in Korea now, but this title will surely be only the first of many.

Black wins by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points

(Translated from *Igo*, Feb. 2004, by John Power.)




Figure 6 (241-282)

J.W. & S. Hardy

Go Suppliers for Australia since 1978

Congratulations to the Kiseido Publishing Company on reaching the historic 100th issue of the popular *Go World Magazine*.

We would also like to thank the many loyal customers who have supported our business for the last twenty-five years.

We carry in stock a wide selection of English-language Go books from all the major publishers, and now also have an expanded range of Go boards, sets and bowls. We can also help with importation of your special needs. Please take advantage of our fast and friendly service.

John Hardy
63 Tristan St., Carindale
QLD 4152 Australia

Phone: 61-7-33988898, fax 61-7-33952261
E-mail: J.Hardy@uq.net.au
Website: www.uq.net.au/~zzjhardy/index.html

10th King of the New Stars: Kong vs. Hu

The Chinese 10th King of the New Stars title match ended in a one-sided triumph for the 20-year-old Kong Jie, who defeated another youthful star in Hu Yaoyu, who is one year his senior.

To qualify for this tournament, one must be 30 or younger and 7-dan or lower. Amateurs are also allowed to participate (WAGC champion Liu Jun won it in 1997). Incidentally, no one has yet repeated as titleholder.

The deciding game below gives us a glimpse of the power of two young players who rank among the top stars on the Chinese scene.

Game Two

White: Kong Jie 7-dan

Black: Hu Yaoyu 7-dan

Komi: 7½. Time: 30 seconds per move + 10 minutes (to be used in 1-minute units at will).

Played in Shanghai on 20 May 2003.

Commentary by Kong Jie.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). White's unbalanced strategy

Instead of 12, I should have made the position more open by playing as in *Dia. 1*. In the game, I seem to have gone too much for profit.

Black 25. Black could also extend at 26 — it's hard to say which move is better.


After the sequence to 37, it's hard to know how White should go about setting hands on the centre. If, instead of 38, he made a two-space jump to 42, Black would cap at A and have the

wider position. If, for that reason, White plunged in as far as A, Black would counterattack at 42, and nothing good for White would come of it.

Taking all this into consideration, I chose to play 38, but Black's counter with 39 and 41 was, after all, severe.

The reason why White made the game difficult for himself was because he lost the proper balance between profit and influence in the opening stage.

When Black plays 47, White is in big trouble.



Dia. 1: a better fuseki





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). Missing the key point


The hane of Black 57 is a careless slip. Correct is extending first at 1 in *Dia. 2*. White won't have the courage to rescue his two stones. The sequence to 5 will follow: Black seizes the initiative, clearly getting a better result than in the game.

White 64 may seem the natural answer to 63, but it's dubious. White 1 in *Dia. 3* is the key stra-

tegic point of the whole board. If Black pushes up at 2, White plays 3 and 5 and can handle this fight. In the game, Black is the one who takes the key point of 73 and seizes the initiative.



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3: the key point

Black 81 is dubious. The centre white group is not yet settled, so White can hardly risk the adventure of an invasion of the top. That being so, there's no need for Black to be in a hurry to play 81. Rather, he should block White's path with Black 82. Turning at White 82 is extremely big. This turns 86 and 88 into effective moves, so White has clearly profited.

Figure 3 (101–130). *Black goes ahead.*

White 10 is dubious. The correct endgame play is for White to settle the shape in sente with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, then to block at 12 in the figure. This way the game would be close but prom-

ising for White. Black's hane at 11 is extremely big — the game is now not bad for Black.






Figure 3 (101–130)



Dia. 4: correct endgame



Dia. 5: ko




Figure 4 (131–159)

Figure 4 (131–159). *White's do-or-die attack*

The contact play of 36 is a do-or-die move. Black wants to take away White's eye shape in sente, then switch to A at the top to repair his defect. White can get a ko, starting with the cut of B — see *Dia. 5*. However, things don't go so smoothly for Black. *Concluded on page 64.*

Go Seigen's Triple Attack



It's a long time since we've published a game by Go Seigen, one of the all-time greats of go (one of the longest-lived too: he will turn 90 on 19 May this year and is still actively studying go). Here is a game from his prime in which, out of a seeming setback, he conjures up a deadly three-way attack. Usually a double attack is severe; a three-way attack can hardly fail to be fatal.

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Go Seigen 9-dan

No komi; time: 10 hours each.

Date: 3, 4 August 1960.

3rd Japan's Strongest Player tournament.

This game was played in the Japan's Strongest Player tournament (*Nihon Saikyo Kettei-sen*), which was a predecessor of the Meijin tournament and was sponsored by the Yomiuri Newspaper. It consisted of a six-player league, in which, as there was no komi, each player played the others twice, once with white and once with black. Go won the first term (1958), Sakata the second (1959), and the two tied for first in the third (1960).

At the time of this game, Go, at 46, was still close to his peak. Hashimoto Shoji, then 25, was a brilliant young star; he was already the top Kansai Ki-in player after Hashimoto Uтарo.

Figure 1 (1-43). Black's good start

Black 27. If Black punishes White's earlier tenuki by cutting at A, White B-Black C-White 27 follow. This is a joseki, but in a sense White has dodged the attack, so Black prefers to attack on a large scale with 27. Instead of answering, White switches to the last large fuseki point with 28. If instead White answered 27 with White 30, Black would switch to D, making a good double-wing formation based on his corner enclosure.






Figure 1 (1-43)

White 34. White 36, letting Black jump to 34, would be too easygoing.

White 40 is necessary, but not for the obvious reason. One might think that the Black 2-4 combination in *Dia. 1* would be good for Black, but to the professional eye that's not so. Go comments that this is uninteresting for Black, as both White 'a' and 'b' will be sente.



Dia. 1: uninteresting



Dia. 2: Black's threat

Rather, Black 2 in *Dia. 2* is a good move. Black reduces the corner territory in sente up to 8, then switches to 10 and 12 for a good result.

The corner fight comes to a pause after 41, but Black is left with the threat of Black E-White F-Black G. At this point, Black has a good game.

White 42 is the follow-up to 30. Black 43 is more or less obligatory: White 43 would make good shape and create forcing moves or even threats in the corner.





Figure 2 (44-77)




Dia. 3: better for White


Figure 2 (44-77). Black gains at the bottom.

White 44 was the sealed move: Hashimoto spent over an hour and a half on it, but it was dubious. White should have taken sente with 1 in Dia. 3, then switched to 3.

When Black attacks with 45, White 46 is the shape move, but even so Black has a severe follow-up at 47.



Dia. 4: painful



Dia. 5: alive

White 48. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black plays 2 and 4. Having to link up with 'a' will be very painful for White, as it is such inefficient shape. After White 'a', Black could be satisfied to switch to A in the figure. He is not concerned about White's blocking at 'b' in the diagram, as he has 'c'.

White 54. If White captures at B, backing up to Black C is good enough; if White then jumps to D, Black will spoil his shape by making an atari at 54.

White is alive after 72. If Black attacks with the placement in Dia. 5, White gets an *oi-otoshi*. Black plays 73 and 75 to stop White from pushing up at D and cutting. Black is satisfied with this result, as he has forestalled an invasion (for example, 3 in Dia. 3) in sente; he has the lead.





Figure 3 (78-100)



Dia. 6: better strategy

Figure 3 (78-100). Nobody's perfect.

White 78 shows White's awareness that he is behind. Creating a weak group at the top when his group below is not settled is a little risky.

White attaches at 86 in an attempt to cover his weak point at A, but provoking 89 hurts the other group.

Black 95. Exchanging Black B for White C and Black D for a white connection would be good for Black, but White won't answer; instead, he'll dodge to E. Black therefore switches to his long-awaited attack with 95 and 97.

Go regretted 99. Instead, he should have played at 1 in Dia. 6. In the first place, Black cuts the white territory down to size; next, he can use his added thickness to attack at 13. If White plays 2 at 3, then this is a good exchange for Black.






Figure 4 (101-137)
7, 14, 29: connect



Dia. 7: retrospective wisdom



Dia. 8: good for Black


Figure 4 (101-137). Go's oversight

Go had overlooked White's move at 8. The black group is now dead, making the game a close contest. At this point, it becomes clear that Black 99 in Figure 4 was premature. If Black had made the Black 1-White 3 exchange in Dia. 6 referred to above, then Black 99 would have worked better. After 8 in the figure —


Dia. 7. Black could play 1 and 3, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. To continue —

Dia. 8. White 4 is a good move, but Black lives in the corner in sente, then pulls back at 15. Even though Black loses five stones, this would be a good result.

Black 23. Black could save the centre top stones with 1 in Dia. 9, but White gets a good result with 2 to 10. White 'a' will be sente against Black's corner, so Black can't hope to attack this group. Note that White has no choice about 2. Instead —



Dia. 9: too good for White



Dia. 10: backfires 8: connects

Dia. 10. If White tries to squeeze with 2, Black will counter by coming out with 3. White can't stop Black from breaking out.

The sequence to 31 is therefore a one-way street, including 31. If instead Black blocks at A, White plays 31 and wins the capturing race.

White 32 is a clever move. Capturing four stones with Black 33 at 34 would be no good.

The game has become complicated, but it's not necessarily bad for Black, as White has weak groups scattered about.

Black launches a ferocious three-way attack with 37.




Figure 5 (138-174)

Figure 5 (138-174). Triple attack

Black 43 looks ominous for White.

The sequence to 50 is inevitable.

Black 59 makes better aji than Black 64.

The continuation to 74 also looks inevitable. White has saved one of his groups.





Figure 6 (175-200)




Dia. 11: ko

Figure 6 (175-200). The game is decided.

The issue is settled when Black switches to 75. The position is still very complicated, but Black plays simply, giving up three stones for a ponnuki.

White 90. If omitted, Black can get an approach-move ko with 1 to 7 in *Dia. 11*.

White 94 and 96 are a clever combination. If Black connects with 97 at 1 in *Dia. 12*, White springs a trap with 2 and 4 — if Black 'a', White 'b'.



Dia. 12: a trap

Figure 7 (201-253). Success for a triple attack

In the process of saving his centre top and side groups, White's centre right group has died, so this decides the game.

White 12 is another sharp move: Black 13 is forced to prevent a cut one line above.

Black 29 etc. is an attempt to make blocking at A sente.

Note White 50: it wins the capturing race with one eye vs. no eye.

When White resigns, he is 12 points behind.

White resigns after Black 253.

(Adapted from a supplement to *Igo*, October 1960. Translated by John Power.)




Figure 7 (201-253)

Continued from page 60




Figure 5 (160-188)

Figure 5 (160-188). Ahead by one

White 60 is the winning move. Black 61 is the only move — if instead Black attaches at 64, White can hane at A.

White ends up one move ahead in the capturing race.

Black resigns after White 188.

(Translated from *Igo*, August 2003 by John Power.)

The Top Ten Tesujis


As selected by 40 professional go players

by Murakami Akira


Tesujis are the most efficient fighting weapons in go. A mastery of tesujis is essential for success at all stages of the game, beginning with the tesujis that lie concealed in josekis and extending to endgame tesujis that may make all the difference in a close game. Whatever your level, studying tesujis will make you stronger, so how about starting with the top ten tesujis?

Back in Go World 77, we published an article entitled 'The Top Ten Life-and-Death Problems'. Belatedly, we would now like to present its companion article.


Forty professionals were asked to select the ten most useful tesujis from a collection submitted by the staff of Kido. They are given in order of popularity.




Problem 1 (11 votes): Black to play
Black has been cut into two, but he can exploit the thinness of White's shape in the corner.




Problem 4 (9 votes): Black to play
There is a capturing-race tesuji here that anyone who aspires to be a dan player should know.




Problem 2 (10 votes): Black to play
Black can get up to some mischief inside White's territory. How can he best use the aji of his captured stones?




Problem 5 (9 votes): Black to play
The marked black stone has been captured, but Black can still make good use of it.



Problem 3 (9 votes): Black to play
Black can seal White in. This position is a perennial in actual play.




Problem 6 (8 votes): Black to play
What is the best way to answer White's peep, the marked stone? Black doesn't want to play submissively here.




Problem 7 (8 votes)

Can Black live with his corner stones? Should he? What is the best way to make use of them?




Problem 8 (8 votes)

This problem really brings home to one the difference between a tesuji and an ordinary move. How can Black link up his stones?



Problem 9 (8 votes)

White's weak point is obvious, but what is the best way to exploit it?




Problem 10 (7 votes)

When you have two different sente moves available, it's often a good idea to keep both in reserve. Black 'a', of course, just provokes White 'b', so it's not a very good sente move anyway. What is the best way for Black to settle his stones?


The next four contenders

As a bonus, here are the problems that just missed out on making the top ten




Problem 11: Black to play

The single black stone can still be put to good use.




Problem 12: Black to play

White has just played the marked stone. Black has to think before he answers.



Problem 13: Black to play

How can Black lay waste to the corner?




Problem 14: Black to play

How can Black rescue his six stones?

Answer to Problem 1: A keen-edged sword


Dia. 1. Black hanes at 1, then cuts at 3. This combination is the epitome of tesuji, which is presumably why professionals chose it as number one. The key point is keeping the two ataris at 'a' and 'b' in reserve, waiting to see how White answers in the corner. If White plays 'c', Black 'a' is a double atari.



Dia. 1: tesuji *Dia. 2: tombstone squeeze*

Dia. 2. The atari of 1 looks like the only move, but then Black ataries at 2, leading White into shortage of liberties. If 3, Black descends at 4. He next sacrifices a stone with 6, setting up the 'tombstone squeeze'. After 9 —


Dia. 3. Black squeezes, then jumps to 5: White collapses. That means that answering at 1 in *Dia. 2* is unreasonable for White.



Dia. 3: White collapses *Dia. 4: compromise*
4: connects

Dia. 4. After *Dia. 1*, White has no choice but to forget about the double atari and capture with 1 or 'a'. Either way, Black captures with 2 and 4, so White's marked cutting stones now look rather foolish.

Answer to Problem 2: A light touch




Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a simple but devastating tesuji that suddenly rips off a piece of the opponent's group. It comes up very often in actual play.


When Black ataries at 1, White has no choice but to capture at 2, letting Black capture three of his stones.

Dia. 2. Things turn out much worse for White if he resists by capturing at 2. Black squeezes with 3, then connects at 5. He wins the capturing

race with four liberties to three.




Dia. 2: worse for White
4: connects



Dia. 3: wrong


Dia. 3. Black 1 is the wrong atari: it goes nowhere.

Dia. 4. Black 1 misses a chance to take profit.



Dia. 4: worst

Answer to Problem 3: Blockade




Dia. 1: correct


Dia. 1. This tesuji was popular with the professionals because it comes up in actual play all the time. It also has a wide range of applications.

Black cuts at 1, then counters White's atari with his own ataris of 3 and 5. Next —

Dia. 2. If White 1, Black takes the ko with 2, forcing White 3 (fighting a ko is rarely feasible: Black's shape from capturing at 3 would be too good), so Black can block at 4. White will attach at 'a' to live, but Black doesn't mind, as he is very satisfied with his outside thickness.




Dia. 2: sealed in



Dia. 3: misguided

Dia. 3. Black mustn't try to save his stone with 3. It's true that he can capture two stones, but this will be gote, and in the meantime White builds a wall that hurts Black's corner enclosure.




Dia. 4: ignorance is not bliss

Dia. 4. If Black simply extends at 1, he will suffer for his ignorance of the tesuji. White defends his cutting point in sente with 2, then pushes up with 4, splitting Black into two and destroying his moyo potential.

Answer to Problem 4: The tombstone squeeze

Dia. 1. When White turns into the corner, it looks as if the two black stones have been captured, but Black can hane at 1. The key move is 5, which follows the proverb, *Increase the sacrifice to two stones*. After 6 —




Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 2: tombstone squeeze


Dia. 2. The throw-in at 1 is the next key move. After 2, Black calmly connects at 3: he wins the capturing race by one move. This tesuji is known as 'the tombstone squeeze', from the resemblance of the shape in the corner to a tombstone. A dan-level player should be able to see this tesuji coming, but players of all levels will benefit from learning it, as it occurs all the time in actual play.

Note that if Black plays 1 at 3, White connects at 1 and wins the capturing race (in accordance with the proverb, *One eye beats no eye*).

Dia. 3. Sometimes twisting behind the opponent with 1 and 3 is a tesuji, but here it loses the fight.



Dia. 3: wrong tesuji
6: connects




Dia. 4: the same tesuji

Dia. 4. This shape is a little different, but the same tesuji applies. With 5, we get the same shape as in Dia. 1.

Answer to Problem 5: Giving the opponent a jolt

Dia. 1. Rapping White on his nose with 1 is a very satisfying tesuji (it's nicknamed 'the goblin's nose contact play'). To play it without having seen it in a book would take a leap of the imagination. This move works well whichever way White answers it.

If White 2, Black 3 seals him off from the centre. Later, Black can atari at 'a' (if White crawls at 'a', on the second line, to avoid this, he only helps Black build centre thickness).




Dia. 1: the tesuji

Dia. 2: a favourable fight

Dia. 2. If White comes out at 2, Black links up with 3. If Black descends at 'a', the corner

white group is dead, so this is not a good fight for White.

Dia. 3. Pushing along at 1 shows a lack of imagination. Black fails to make any use of his marked stone.




Dia. 3: bad style

Dia. 4: gote

Dia. 4. Black 1 is often a good move, but it doesn't match the situation. White plays 2 and 4, and a comparison with *Dia. 1* shows that his centre blockade here is inferior. The nose tesuji makes all the difference.

Answer to Problem 6: Keeping sente

Dia. 1. If you don't think, you may automatically connect at 1, giving White another sente move at 2.




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Cutting across the knight's move with 1 is the tesuji. Thanks to this move, Black keeps sente, so he can move out into the centre ahead of White. The drawback is that he helps White to strengthen himself, but in the middle of a fight sente is more important.

Dia. 3. This is an endgame application of the tesuji. If Black answers White 1 with 2, he lets White take endgame profit in sente.



Dia. 3: wrong


Dia. 4: correct

Dia. 4. Again, cutting across the knight's move is the tesuji. Black gives White some extra profit, but we're assuming that sente is more important. Note that if Black simply plays 2 at 4, White pulls back at 2 and aims at jumping into the corner at 6.

Answer to problem 7: Using all your stones

Dia. 1. This problem is not about capturing or saving stones, but using the stones you have played in the most efficient way.

Black could live with the two stones in the corner, but it's better to give them up. Black 1 and 3 are a tesuji combination. When Black hanes at 7, he has driven a wedge through the middle of the white position and made the marked white stone useless. Although he has lost three stones, this is an efficient result for Black.




Dia. 1: success

Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. Black 1 and 3 are crude. This way the marked white stone continues to be effective; even if Black plays another stone, he can't get as strong a position as in *Dia. 1*. If he doesn't watch out, his four stones might even become a target for attack.

Dia. 3. Black can live in the corner with 1 to 5, but this hurts his stones on the outside. After White jumps to 6, they are very weak. They could flee with 'a', but that is unlikely to help Black much.




Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 4: good for Black

Dia. 4. This is another illustration of the same principle. By sacrificing an extra stone with 1, Black gets an excellent squeeze and greatly weakens the marked stone. Playing Black 1 at 2 would be inferior.


Answer to Problem 8: The importance of timing



Dia. 1: the crosscut tesuji


Dia. 1. This is yet another famous shape. In order to save his three stones, Black has to capture two white ones. The key here is the two ataris at 'a' and 'b': Black keeps them in reserve and attaches at 1. Black 3 next exploits White's shortage of liberties: White can't save his key stones.

If Black starts out with either atari, he can't rescue his stones.




Dia. 2: captured

Dia. 2. If White 1, Black ataries at 2, and White can't connect at 'a'.



Dia. 3: captured

Dia. 3. If instead White plays at 1, Black plays the other atari and again captures the two stones.




Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 4. If Black ataries at 1 first, he can't save his stones. Likewise if he plays 1 at 2. Timing is everything.

Answer to Problem 9: The vital point

Dia. 1. Black 1 is sente, but that's the only thing that can be said in its favour. White 2 makes good shape. After 4, White's corner is secure, and the white stone cutting Black into two promises to be a nuisance. This result is a clear failure for Black.




Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 2: the vital point

Dia. 2. Black must strike at the vital point of 1 immediately. If White submissively connects at 2, Black is satisfied; he pulls back at 3, and can look forward to playing 'a', which will probably be sente, later. If White plays 2 at 'b', Black makes good shape with 'c'—White 2—Black 'd'.

Dia. 3. If White ataries at 2, Black is happy to extend at 3. If White 4, Black plays 5 and 7 and is satisfied.



Dia. 3: satisfied

Dia. 4: wrong


Dia. 4. Black 1 is a mistake in timing. White will extend at 2; if Black now plays 3, White is happy to answer at 4. The forcing exchange of Black 'a'—White 'b' loses much of its value, as Black 1 would be more efficient if it were at 'c'.

Answer to Problem 10: Sabaki tesuji


Dia. 1. The atari of Black 1 is crude; Black 3 is also bad: it just provokes 4, after which Black has to flee with 5, which commits the sin of 'pushing the cart from behind'. Black just helps White to enclose territory while making a heavy shape.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the tesuji for making *sabaki* (settling a group). Note that it makes use of the


threat of the ataris at both 'a' and 'b'. If White were rash enough to hane at 'c', Black 'a' would be perfect. Well, this would be too much to expect, but —




Dia. 1: awful



Dia. 2: good style



Dia. 3: good for Black



Dia. 4: good for Black

Dia. 3. If White extends at 2, Black's choice between his two ataris is easy. Black 3 is very effective: it's actually a sacrifice, enabling Black to drive a wedge between the white stones with 5 and 7. Up to 8, Black gets an excellent result.


This is a tesuji you never see in professional play: good players will never let the opponent split them into two in this fashion.

Dia. 4. If White extends at 2, Black pokes his head out with 3, taking all the pressure off his stones. If White takes a firm grip on the black stone with 4, Black hanes at 5 and is more than satisfied.


Answers to bonus problems

Problem 11

Dia. 1. The diagonal move of 1 is the vital point. The best White can do is to atari at 2 and let Black link up with 3 and 5.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: wrong


Dia. 2. Black may think that he can get the same result by attaching at 2, but there is a pit-fall: after 3, White can descend at 4.

Problem 12

Cutting at 1 is a well-timed move. White has no choice but to connect at 2, whereupon Black answers the hane with 3 and 5. The presence of 1 gives Black potential sente moves in this area. If Black plays 1 after the 3–4 exchange, White will simply answer at 'a'.




Problem 13



Black 1 is an exquisite move. If White 2, Black plays 3 and 5 and has scored a great success. If White plays 2 at 'a' or 'b', Black 2 becomes sente, so Black easily lives in the corner.

Problem 14



Wedging in at 1 is the tesuji. Getting a stone at 3 makes it possible to link up with 5. If White 2 at 4, Black plays 2. If Black simply plays 1 at 5, White answers at 'a', and Black can't link up.

(Kido, February 1996. Translated by John Power.)

Most Captures in One Game

If the criterion is the number of stones captured, the most bloodthirsty game in go history must be one played between two of the bitterest rivals in go history, Honinbo Jowa and Gen'an Inseki, in 1814–15.

This game features a dizzying series of captures, reversals, sacrifices and trades that easily make it one of the most spectacular games ever. By the time it finished, after 354 moves, the players had captured 150 stones. So far as we know, it's the only game in which the captures go into three figures.

White: Kuzuno Jowa 5-dan (1787–1847)

Black: Gen'an Inseki 4-dan (1798–1859)

Played on the 11th day of the 9th month, 1814, and the 8th day of the 1st month, 1815.

Commentary by Hashimoto Uтарo 9-dan.

Jowa and Gen'an Inseki were great rivals for the top post in the Edo go world, Meijin godokoro. Jowa was successful in 1831, but only as a result of behind-the-scenes intrigues. He was forced to resign in 1839, when the unsavoury details were made public, but Gen'an Inseki never attained the post. (To be precise, Gen'an [or Gennan] Inseki is the name this player took upon retirement. At the time of this game, he was known as Hattori Rittetsu, as he was a disciple of the Hattori house.)

Jowa became the Honinbo heir in 1819 and the 12th Honinbo in 1827. Gen'an Inseki became the 10th head of the Inoue house in 1824.

Figure 1 (1–50)

White 28 and 30 are a severe response to Black 27. Jowa was not the kind of player who would answer a challenge with a mild move like 28 at 44.

Black 39 is also a severe move, and White responds in kind with 42.

Figure 2 (51–100)

The cut of 59 is severe, but taking a firm grip on the white stone in the bottom left with Black 64 would also be a good move.

White 70 is not concerned only with the local fight; White also has his eye on the black stones above (63 etc.).




Figure 1 (1–50)




Figure 2 (51–100)

Black tenukies twice in the centre, with 89 and 95. He is confident his centre group can look after itself.

Figure 3 (101–150)

Black 3 is a tricky move to handle. Even when White answers conservatively with 4, Black can still make the fierce contact play of 7. If White counters with 1 in *Dia. 1*, he falls into a trap. Black cuts off some stones up to 14.

Black 13 and 15 are a clever combination. If White uses 16 to block at 1 in *Dia. 2*, he falls into another trap. Black 4 is sente, so the white

stones above are cut off. White 3 at 'a' makes no difference: Black 4, White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 16 is White's best answer.

White 24. If at 40, Black will play 38, which is worse for White.

White 36 forestalls Black A.

White can't avoid a ko fight for the life of his group on the side.





Figure 3 (101-150)
47, 50: ko



Dia. 1
11: connects

Dia. 2

Figure 4 (151-200)

The ko fight favours Black. The only ko threat White can come up is 60, so Black finishes off the ko with 61, capturing nearly 30 white stones. Who was to know that this was only the start?

Black 63. In theory, all Black has to do to win is to secure life for this group.

White 66 is a sign of determination or desperation. Usually you would expect White to secure the safety of the group to the right by

connecting at White 67. However, if he did so, Black would secure two eyes by attaching at 66; there would be nothing left to fight over, so White would have to resign.

Black 89 is a slip that was bitterly regretted by Gen'an. 'Black 89 was careless . . . If Black had played at 92, he would have won without counting. Laughable, laughable.'

If Black 92, White must answer at A; if Black next hanes at 95 or descends at 96, he wins the capturing race.




Figure 4 (151-200)
56, 59: ko




Figure 5 (201-230)

Figure 5 (201-230)

Now the roles are reversed: Black is behind in the capturing race, so he is desperately seeking a way to rescue his group.






Figure 6 (231-260)
ko: 53, 56, 59



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 6 (231-260)

Black 39 is another mistake. If Black follows *Dia. 3*, White dies unconditionally. Gennan commented that this would have won the game.

White 40 is a tesuji that Gennan presumably overlooked. Thanks to this move, White 42 threatens to link up on the edge, so a ko can't be avoided.

Black has to play 57 to win the ko fight, but this is painful, as Black loses the aji shown in *Dia. 4*. The moves to 5 give a ko.

The above diagram explains why White makes the unusual-looking answer at 58.

White 60 forestalls Black A, White 60, Black B, White C, Black D.

Figure 7 (261-300)

White 66 forestalls Black A, but descending at White 67 would be simpler. Either way, the game is a win for White.

Figure 8 (301-354)

[White 20. White could save a group and capture some black stones with an atari two spaces to the right of 6, but it's too small. How

often can you say that about a move worth 70 points?]

White wins by 11 points

(Based on the commentary in *Gen'an Inseki*, published by Chikuma Shobo. Translated by John Power.)




Figure 7 (261-300)

71: ko (at 67); ko (over 73): 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94; 95: ko (at 77); 96: connects (above 70); 97: ko (at 73); 100: ko (below 73).





Figure 8 (301-354)

ko (over 3): 10, 13, 16; 18: ko (above 15); ko (over 3): 27, 32; 33: ko (at 15); 35: ko (at 3); 36: at 30; 37: takes (at 28); 38: ko (at 3); 42: ko (above 15); 43: ko (left of 4); 44: connects (above 40); 45: connects (right of 41).
White connects the ko (above 15).


Original Moves

In this article, we look at four examples of creativity in go. In all of the positions below, the players came up with bold, original moves. How about matching wits with them and seeing what you would do if you were in their place? If you think of the same move, you can be proud of your feel for go.




1. Black to play

The marked white stone is an irregular approach move. White (Kobayashi Koichi) wants to stop Black from building a moyo; the marked stone tries to strike a balance between attacking the right side and the group to the left. If Black makes the ordinary answer of 'a' (or 'b'), White will be happy to extend to 'c'. Black (Fujisawa Shuko) came up with an answer that was unexpected but immediately convincing.




2. Black to play

Hint: There is a very severe but far-from-obvious move for attacking the centre right white group.



3. Black to play

Black wants to contrive a double attack on the centre and right-side white groups. In this case, he tries the direct approach.




4. White to play


Black has just attacked with the marked stone. White wants to look after his two stones while developing his centre potential. Can you guess his next move?

The above positions were all selected by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan and Tei Meiko, then 6-dan, as candidates for a *Kido* 'Best Move Grand Prix' in 1987.

will most likely consider his original move a success. Note that, though sente, it is better not to push along at 'a'.



Dia. 6: Black is satisfied



Dia. 7: better for White, but ...




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1. In the game, Kobayashi took sente with 14 and 16 so that he could switch to the right side with 18. Instead of 21, Black could have played more aggressively by peeping at 22. Black was probably not completely satisfied when White moved out into the centre up to 26. Even so, attacking with 27 secured a big right-side territory, so Black had an easy game.

(Kido, May 1987)



Fujisawa Shuko




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2. When Black has to give way with 61, the position is not good for him. However, White 98 is the losing move. When Black plays 99, then jumps to 3 in the next figure, followed by 15, he has a win.

Figure 3 (next page)

Moves 150 to 259 omitted. Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

(Game record from the 1988 Igo Nenkan.)





Figure 3 (101-149)

Answer to Problem 2



Dia. 1: a ferocious clamp


White: Koyama Yasuo 9-dan; Black: Miyazawa Goro 7-dan. 35th NHK Cup (16 March 1987).

Dia. 1. The clamp is a common tesuji in fighting, but it is usually played when it has more allies in place. Here it is as if lightning has struck out of a clear sky. Koyama was probably astonished.

A lesser mortal would hane at 'a', but extending at 1 is good for White. Black will be dissatisfied because his bottom position is still quite thin.


Dia. 2. White extended at 2, even though he knew Black was going to wedge in at 3 next. After 4 and 6, he can move out into the centre. If instead White plays 2 at 3, Black blocks at 2, and

White's chances of settling his group don't look good.



Dia. 2: the continuation (i)

The only problem is that the continuation from 2 was probably the one Black was counting on. A surprise move is all the more effective with the limited time of TV games.



Dia. 3: better for White

Dia. 3. Actually, the strange-looking move of 1 may be a better counter. If Black 2, White 3; if Black 3, White 2: either way, Black can't play the wedge of 3 in *Dia. 2*.

Black will most likely block at 2, then force with 4. Deciding how to continue his attack will now be quite difficult for Black.


However, the exchange of 2 for 3 has strengthened Black's bottom position, so his bold

clamp has been a success.


Dia. 4. White continues after *Dia. 2* with the hane at 1. At a glance, this looks like a tesuji, but Black captures with 2 and 4 regardless, whereupon White finds it surprisingly difficult to handle the situation.

Since the ladder doesn't work, he has to extend at 5. When Black presses at 6, he pushes through at 7, and Black can't block at 'a'. However, Black now unveils a second strong move: the hane of 8. The six white stones here have been cut off and seem to have no prospect of living. If White had used 7 to forestall the hane, he might have been able to live, but even so it is already clear that Black has seized the initiative.

Instead of 1 here —



Dia. 4: the continuation (ii)



Dia. 5: correct for White



Miyazawa Goro

Dia. 5. White should have followed up *Dia. 2* with 1 and 3. It's not so easy for Black to continue his attack — he would probably force with 4, then switch to expanding the top with 6 and 8.

Looking at the overall position, swallowing up the two white stones is big, so Black has quite a good game. With the threat of 'a' at his disposal, Black can still hope to take some profit by harassing the white group.

If both this diagram and *Dia. 3* give Black a reasonable result, we can conclude that his clamp was a good move.

Figure 1. With 25 and 27, Black stakes the game on his moyo. When White sets out to reduce it with 28, he attacks forcefully with 33 on.




Figure 1 (1-39)

Figure 2. The moves from White 40 on show the fighting spirit typical of fast games, but the result is that White collapses after Black 53. White writhes around for another 50 or so moves after this, then resigns.

(Kido, May 1987 & *Go Weekly*, 21 April 1987)




Figure 2 (40-67)

55: connects




Figure 3 (68-100)

71: connects

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. There's nothing subtle about Black 1: it's like a slap in the face. Usually moves as direct as this don't work well in professional-level play, but Kato knows what he's doing.

Dia. 2. If Black just tries to keep the two groups separated with a move like 1, White will reinforce the right-side group with 2 and 4. Black won't be able to mount an effective attack on the centre group.






Figure 4 (101-121)




Dia. 1: a frontal assault

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei; Black: Kato Masao Meijin. Play-off to decide the 12th Gosei challenger (11 June 1987).




Dia. 2: little pressure on White




Dia. 3: White escapes

Dia. 3. If Black presses at 1, White easily extricates himself with 2 and 4. If Black tries 3 at 'a', White answers with 'b': Black has no chance of catching White.

Dia. 4. If White answers the side contact play by extending at 2, Black presses at 3 as in *Dia. 3*. If White tries the same counter with 4 and 6, there's a difference: Black pulls back at 7, and White can't escape. If White keeps pushing, exchanging 'a' for Black 'b', he finds that Black 1 is in just the right place to make a diagonal connection.




Dia. 4: good for Black



Dia. 5: probably unreasonable

Dia. 5. Trying to live with 3 and 5, instead of fleeing, looks unreasonable. Even if by some lucky chance White does secure life, he will make Black very solid on the outside in the proc-

ess, so his centre group will once again be exposed to danger.



Dia. 6: the game

Dia. 6. In the game, White tried to settle his group on the side with 1 etc., though at the cost of permitting Black the hane at 4. Even after 5 and 7, the white group is not yet completely safe. Instead of harassing it further, Black is content to secure the capture of the centre group with 8. This makes him very thick. Note that if White tries to escape with 'a', Black 'b' is just right.

This fight decides the game.




Figure 1 (1-48)

Figure 1. White 22. The usual move would be White 44. The same comment applies to White 24, but White is aiming at 28. Black is ready with the counter of 29 and 31.

White 32 and 34 are too greedy. Black 35 is a good move.

White 44. Not being able to answer Black 43 by extending above 22 is painful.

White has no choice but to plunge in at 46.



Kato Masao




Figure 2 (49–100)

Figure 2. Black 49 is a powerful move typical of Kato. White decides to give priority to settling his group on the right side, but the game seems to have been decided after Black 53 and 57.

White 66 and Black 67 are miai.
Black 69 is a probe, but Black seems to have overestimated the value of its aji — blocking at 77 is dubious, as White 78 is big. Black 79 is forced.

Black 81 starts the last crucial fight. White's response with 82 to 88 is slack, and this time the issue really is decided.




Figure 3 (101–150)

Figure 3. White 6. White 17 would be bigger.



Figure 4 (151–199)
95: connects (left of 73)

Figure 4

White resigns after Black 199.


(Kido, August 1987. Game commentary from the 1988 Igo Nenkan.)

Answer to Problem 4



Dia. 1: out-and-out centre orientation
 White: Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan; Black: Cho Chikun 9-dan. 13th Tengen semifinal (17 Sept. 1987).

Dia. 1. White 1 and 3 are thoroughgoing centre-oriented moves. An attach-and-extend combination like this on the 5th line must be very rare — it is the sign of a very individualistic player. White knows that this is slack territorially, but his strategy is to stake the game on the centre.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. In the same local position (the other half of the board was different; also, the colours have been reversed) from Game Three in the 1987 Kisei title match (see GW49, page 21), Takemiya played 1 in order to stop Kobayashi Koichi from linking up. The sequence to 16 followed. However, in that game the marked stone was not in place on the right side and there was a white stone at 'a', so the overall position was quite different.

When Black has an extension on the right side, the exchange of White 1 for Black 2 in it-

self is a major loss for White. Simply cutting off a stone by playing Black 4 at 8, followed by White 9 and Black 15, would make the game uninteresting for White. If White plays 3 at 'b', Black moves out comfortably with 'c'.

Playing the attach-and-extend combination in *Dia. 1* in order to expand White's moyo at the bottom may be unusual, but strategically it is a straightforward approach.




Dia. 3: the game (i)

Dia. 3. In the game, Black rammed into White at 1, then linked up with 3. His plan is to respond to the cut at 4 by seeking sabaki in the upper left corner.




Sonoda Yuichi — famed for his centre-oriented style, which is sometimes called 'the western cosmic style'



Dia. 4: dubious

Dia. 4. Manoeuvring to forestall the cut by attaching at 3 is uninteresting, as this just helps White to solidify his corner with 4 and 6. Black can push down at 7, but when White hanes at 8, he probably can't neglect linking up with 9 any longer. Connecting at 10 now makes White quite thick. In this result, White would be able to compete not only on his moyo but in actual territory.




Dia. 5: forestalling the cut

Dia. 5. If Black wants to prevent the cut, the forthright way to do so is with the diagonal connection of 3. This is quite feasible. White 4 and 6, sealing Black in, are the only moves, so Black then links up with 7.

In this position, White would expand his moyo with 8; this invites the hane of 9, whereupon White will probably challenge Black to a do-or-die struggle with 10. After 10, Black plays 'a' or 'b'. It's hard to imagine he will be captured, but, depending on the way he lives and how much pressure he comes under, the flow of the game could turn in White's favour.


Cho Chikun didn't like the prospect of this Sonoda-style frontal clash, so he played a different variation.



Dia. 6: the game (ii)

Dia. 6. Black continues after *Dia. 3* by attaching at 1 — he is threatening to atari at 'a'. White answers solidly with 2 and 4, permitting Black to slide at 5.

Black has gouged out the corner, but White has built up vast influence in the centre, so he has more or less achieved his goal.



Dia. 7: bad for White

Dia. 7. If White blocks at 1 instead of 4 in the previous diagram, Black 2 and 4 give him a bad result. White 7 may be a tesuji, but Black has the counter of 8 and 10. At this point, the two corner black stones prove to be very useful for Black.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1. White temporarily switches to profit with 40, but with 48 he sets about reconstructing his moyo.

After the game, Sonoda commented that he had to play 50 at 'a'.




Figure 2 (51–101)

Figure 2. Black 51 is an overplay — connecting at 53 would be good enough.

White 52 should be at 56, according to Ishida Akira 9-dan. If White discarded the corner and switched to 96, he would have a promising game.

White 54. Perhaps an atari at 69 would be better.



Cho Chikun coped adequately with Sonoda's novel strategy.

When White is hit with Black 55 and 71, he can't hope to win.

White resigns after Black 101.

(Kido, November 1987. Game record from the 1988 *Igo Nenkan*. Translated by John Power.)

Play Go Online Using *THE KISEIDO GO SERVER (KGS)*

The Kiseido Go Server (KGS) is now up and running with go players from all over the world playing games on it. We at Kiseido would like to invite you to visit it, explore it, and perhaps play some games on it. It can be accessed through Kiseido's home page at <http://www.kiseido.com>, or you can go to it directly at <http://kgs.kiseido.com>. There is no charge for playing games on this site, and this server works for Linux/Unix, Mac, and Windows.


Kiseido hopes to make this server a place where go players of all ranks can enjoy playing go. A number of strong players are often online and they are happy to play instructional games with kyu-players and comment on their moves after the game using the special KGS editing feature.

The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (4)

by Oya Koichi 9-dan

In Go World 86-88, we ran a three-part series by Oya on new joseki moves that had originated in Korea. This came from a series that appeared in Kido. Subsequently, Oya published a detailed analysis of the one-space low pincer against a small-knight approach move to a star-point stone in the little booklet that is given as a supplement to Kido (and its successor Monthly Go World). To put the Korean innovations in context, Oya gives a very thorough treatment of the josekis in question, comprehensively analysing the main patterns seen in professional play. We believe that his approach is very useful and instructive for amateurs, so we present a complete translation of the booklet below.

Theme One



Theme One. In this article, I would like to focus on the joseki in the bottom left corner. Black has various answers to 6, but here I want to look at the one-space jump to 7, which is the most popular move.

Pattern One. White jumps to 1 and Black presses at 2. I'm sure my readers are familiar with this pattern. After the continuation to 10, White plays a splitting move at 11. This is the current joseki: it is the Japanese style.


Dia. 1. Black 1 instead of 10 in Pattern One is the old joseki. The good point of 1 is that




Oya Koichi 9-dan

Born on 22 March 1966, Oya is the leading disciple of Kobayashi Koichi. He is one of the most studious professionals at the Nihon Ki-in (he could be regarded as Abe Yoshiteru's successor) and is an authority on new moves and new josekis. Oya is active in study groups and has organized a number of unofficial exchange matches with young Korean professionals.


Black 'a' will be sente; the drawback is that White is left with the forcing move of 'b'.



Pattern One: Japanese conventional wisdom




Dia. 1: the old joseki



Dia. 2: proper shape

Dia. 2. The solid connection of 1 makes proper shape. It eliminates Black's weakness, so it's superior.

Dia. 3. We have shown two old josekis. Nowadays the knight's move of 1 is considered standard. Black is not afraid of White 2. Why? Because he can still do something in the corner. First, however, Black 7 is a perfect large point.




Dia. 3: variation


Dia. 4. The vital point is the 3-3. Black 3 and 5 secure unconditional life.

Dia. 5. Black 3 and 5 are a practical variation, taking more territory. The drawback is the distant threat of an approach-move ko set up by White 6 to 10.


Dia. 6. If White blocks with 2, Black 3 is the shape move. If White 4, Black lives up to 11.




Dia. 4: Black lives



Dia. 5: alternative




Dia. 6: alive




Dia. 7: ko preferable

Dia. 7. White 4 and 6 are a more difficult variation. If possible, depending on his ko threats, Black wants to counter by fighting a ko.

Dia. 8. Black can live outright by connecting at 9, but having White play 10 in sente is a little painful.




Dia. 8: painful




Dia. 9: wrong

Dia. 9. Don't slip up! Black 5 is not sente. White 6 kills the group.



Dia. 10: follow-up to the Japanese pattern

Dia. 10. After Pattern One, the moves here might be played. There are many examples from actual play; the balance between profit and thickness is equal at this point. I don't know what the continuation will be — every player will play differently.




Dia. 11: alternative strategy

Dia. 11. If White plays 2 in response to Black 1, Black can enjoy harassing him with 3. White lives with 4 and 6, but in this position Black 7 is sente, so Black can invade at 'a' later. Compared to *Dia. 10*, White gets a lot less corner profit.


Korean conventional wisdom

Black 1! Peeping here at this stage is the Korean style. It's territorial or should I say severe?

At any rate, Black tries to make his stones work to the utmost.



Conventional wisdom in Korea




Dia. 1: merits unclear

Dia. 1. At this point, White will connect at 2, so Black's aim is to build a solid territory with 5 to 11. Even so, Black's thickness at the bottom becomes unfocussed. I can't decide on the merits of this strategy.


Dia. 2. If White wanted to turn Black 1 into a bad move, he might answer 5 with 6, but the loss from the 1-2 exchange is a mere two points. When Black jumps to 7, it's clear that White's strategy has failed. This result is good for Black.

Dia. 3. In the Japanese-style sequence given in *Dia. 10* Black can't peep at 5, as White can counter with 6. Consequently, the Korean view presumably is that *Dia. 1* represents a gain in


efficiency for Black. I can't give a definitive judgement on this.



Dia. 2: good for Black



Dia. 3: White's counter




Pattern Two: Japanese conventional wisdom

Pattern Two. In this joseki, White answers Black's pressing move at 2 by attaching at 3. The continuation to 8 is the joseki. How would the reader evaluate this result? In Korea, it's regarded as approximately equal . . .


Dia. 1. In this position, Black can peep at 1 in the corner. If White 2, Black 3 or —

Dia. 2. Black can also play 3 and 5 or —


Dia. 3. Black can also destroy White's territory with the sequence from 3 to 7.




Dia. 1: the peep



Dia. 2: Black lives




Dia. 3: living in the corner



Dia. 4: Black's tesuji

Dia. 4. If White answers 1 with 2 or 'a', Black has the tesuji of 3. The possibility of this measure leaves White dissatisfied. The same reasoning should apply in Korea.




Dia. 5: the old joseki

Dia. 5. Before going on to the main theme, I'd like to give one more variation. White attaches at 3 before playing 5 to 11. In this shape, White 'a' will be severe, so defending at 12 is necessary. White plays 13, and locally this variation is playable for him.


The Korean conventional wisdom

Following the *Theme One* diagram given on page 86, White plays the knight's move of 1 (*next page*). This tight move is really typical of

the territory-oriented Korean style, and many Japanese players play this move too. What differences from the Japanese conventional wisdom emerge?




The Korean style



Dia. 1: corner profit

Dia. 1. Black plays the same as before. The difference for White is there's no move for Black left in the corner. In other words, the Korean approach emphasizes White's large corner profit. The supremacy of profit is the difference from Japan.




Dia. 2: Black's counter


Dia. 2. Black will take a moment to think. His counter is descending at 4. Please don't misunderstand, however. Japanese players believe that Dia. 1 is playable for Black, so they won't descend at 4. This move is also Korean style.

Dia. 3. Which comes first, 1 or 3? I'll leave

that to you to think about. The shape made by the moves to 7 matches the joseki. Turning once at 3, creating a defect in Black's shape, is the usual strategy.




Dia. 3: the ordinary joseki



Dia. 4: Ma Xiaochun's strategy

Dia. 4. I was once astonished to see White simply play 1 to 5. I suppose the idea is to choose later among 'a', 'b', and 'c'. You could say that this is a flexible way of thinking, but . . .



Dia. 5: Black is thick


Dia. 5. There are very few games in which White has simply jumped with the marked stone. Not only I but all Japanese professionals would be satisfied to back up and defend at 1. Dia. 3 looks like the standard strategy to me.

Dia. 6. We have now reached the most interesting part of the discussion: how should Black reinforce against White 'a'? The shoulder hit of 1 is one strategy. This is the first drawback of the small knight's move. Black plays 3 to 7, but, as White still has the threat of 'a', perhaps Black is a little thin.


Dia. 7. The attachment of 1 is the second drawback of the small knight's move. If White answers at 2, invading on the 3-3 point with Black 3 works perfectly. White has little choice about 4, so Black links up with 5 and is more or less alive. However, this would be a reasonable game for both sides.

Dia. 8. Resisting with White 4 leads to trou-


ble when Black cuts at 5. All White can do is to hane at 'a' or atari at 'b', but, as you can readily imagine, either the bottom three white stones or the two on the side are in for a hard time.



Dia. 6: reinforcing the weak point




Dia. 7: alternative reinforcement strategy




Dia. 8: not looking good for White

Dia. 9. An alternative for White is to counter with 2. If Black plays 3 and 5, there are no problems, but . . .




Dia. 9: a counter . . .




Dia. 10: refuted

Dia. 10. Black has the radical counter of 5 here — the strain is too much for my brain. Let's wait for this variation to appear in actual play so that we can find out the continuation.

Dia. 11 (conclusion). This is from a game played some time back between my teacher, Kobayashi Koichi (black), and Kato Masao. My teacher often used the pattern in the bottom right, but he doesn't play it now. The reason is that the consensus in Japan is that it favours White.




Dia. 11: good for White?



Dia. 12: difference of opinion


Dia. 12. The bottom right stone has been changed to the star point. The question is how one evaluates the sequence from 8 to 18. The conclusion in Korea is that Black's profit makes it favourable for him. Perhaps Black 11 is at 'a'. However, Japanese professionals don't play 13 — no matter how impressive Korean research is.



Dia. 13: national preference?

Dia. 13. The Japanese style is to play 2 to 10. In short, Japanese prefer the thickness White builds in *Dias. 11* and *12*, whereas the Koreans like the actual profit Black secures. My conclusion is that how one handles Theme One on page 86 is a matter of personal preference.


Theme Two




The next pattern is the attach-and-extend sequence of 1 to 5. According to my usual way of thinking, the alternatives for White are A and B. White C is rare but not out of the question. However, none of these moves is the Korean style.

Pattern One. If White answers in the direction of 1, the sequence to 11 is the usual continuation. White hasn't played any funny moves. This is a commonsense exchange, and I think the

result is equal. However, Korean players are dissatisfied with White's result.




Pattern One: Japanese conventional wisdom



Korean conventional wisdom

Jumping down to 1 is the Korean style. It's considered absurd to cede to Black the 3-3-point profit. It's too slack! And so we see the extremely tight move of 1. It aims at linking up next with 'a'.




Dia. 1: the old sequence

Dia. 1. Intercepting with Black 2 is essential. A skirmish in the centre follows with 3 to 11. The only problem is that Black's shape has an obvious weakness: the peep of White 'a'...


Dia. 2. Black 8 is the revised version. There may be other variations, but anyway the idea is that White makes sure of the corner profit and welcomes a fight. You can't help being impressed when a territorial emphasis goes this far.

Dia. 3. There's just one thing you have to watch out for. White can't answer the contact play of 6 with the hane at 7 — that lets Black get a squeeze.

Theme Two is not the main line in Japan, so I'm going to move on now.




Dia. 2: the revised pattern



Dia. 3: White slips up

Theme Three




Here's the move you've been waiting for: the double approach move. The differences from Korea are prominent with the low approach move, so I'm going to focus on it and also restrict myself to White's answer at 2.


Dia. 1. The sequence to 5 is a safe one for both sides. One does feel a little that White could resist more strongly, but at any rate this is peaceful.

Dia. 2. When Black plays the high approach move, White has only two answers, one being 6 here. Permitting Black 7 can't be helped. This is the main variation.


Dia. 3. White can't resist with 6: he collapses after 7 to 15. What? White can avoid collapse by playing 8 at 'a'? And give Black a ponnuki at 8? You must be joking.




Dia. 1: the safe variation



Dia. 2: the high move




Dia. 3: collapse




Dia. 4: variation 2

Dia. 4. The second variation is to extend at 6. This move focusses on the centre, and the joseki ends with 11. White now switches to a large point elsewhere. There are advantages and disadvantages to this variation, so White will choose it as part of an overall strategy.

Dia. 5. When Black plays the high move, then after the joseki White's checking extension at 1 becomes sente. Moves on all the adjacent points will also be sente.




Dia. 5: sente



*Dia. 6: not sente
2: tenuki*


Dia. 6. With the low move, White 1 is not sente. The placement of 3 is not a threat.

Korean conventional wisdom




Invading immediately at 1 is a new strategy. I'm not sure it was invented in Korea, but certainly it's been much researched there.

Dia. 1. If White 2, Black gets a good result with 3. Why? Because he hasn't made the exchange of Black 'a' for White 'b'. There are cases where you have to make this exchange, but usually —




Dia. 1: good for Black




Dia. 2: extra profit

Dia. 2. Playing 1 and 3 is more profitable for Black.

Dia. 3. In a position in which White really wants to capture the marked black stone, he can block solidly at 2. After 3, he extends at 4 . . . The continuation is interesting, as once again there's a divergence of opinion.



Dia. 3: blocking




Dia. 4: Japanese style


Dia. 4. Japanese players would connect at 1 without fail. We've been brought up to regard this as the right way to play. We might consider other moves, but the basic move is 1. In a fast game, we'd play it instantly.

Dia. 5. Many Korean players would descend at 1. I won't go so far as to call it the standard

move in Korea, but you can certainly think of it as the Korean style. The virtue of 1?




Dia. 5: Korean style




Dia. 6: linking up

Dia. 6. Needless to say, Black can link up with 1.

Dia. 7. On the other hand, White might block at 1. If Black tenukies, White 3 and 5 will give him a jolt.




*Dia. 7: severe
2: tenuki*




Dia. 8: side attack

Dia. 8. Alternatively, White might attack from the side with 1, aiming at the weak point of 'a'. Even though it's gote, I think that *Dia. 4* makes Black thick. What does the reader think?

Pattern One. The prologue has been quite lengthy. Let's get to grips with Pattern One. As you can tell from our analysis so far, blocking at 2 is the main line in this pattern.




Pattern One




Dia. 1: White is thick

Dia. 1. Before Pattern One was developed, there was a line in which Black made a hane at 1 before invading at 3. Up to 11, a trade follows, with Black taking the corner and White the side. In this fuseki, White's thickness is a little superior. Later —

Dia. 2. White 1 is sente. Black jumps to 2 to avoid giving White a squeeze, but White is left with the endgame combination of 3 and 5. This is a nasty threat for Black to have to live with.




Dia. 2: follow-up




Dia. 3: joseki

Dia. 3. For that reason, the joseki sequence is 1 to 6. Let's look at the reasons for playing 4, 5 and 6.

Dia. 4. Let's look at a familiar basic joseki. If, instead of making a double approach move, Black simply invades the 3-3 with 3, blocking at 4 is the most conventional of conventional wisdom. The result to 11 is equal.




Dia. 4: the only move




Dia. 5: the other block

Dia. 5. Blocking on the other side at 4 is also a joseki, but . . .

Dia. 6. If next White 1, Black plays 2 or 'a', negating White's thickness. This is a slack result for White.



Dia. 6: slack




Dia. 7: tewari


Dia. 7. If White 1, he has to worry about Black 'a'. In short, White has played two moves

that diverge from common sense: 4 in *Dia. 5* and 1 in this diagram.

Dia. 8. Here, however, Black 2 is a bad move, as it's too close to White's thickness. This shape is actually the same as *Dia. 3*.




Dia. 8: tewari



Dia. 9: severe


Dia. 9. The question is who has done the worse: White with his two dubious moves or Black with his one. After *Dia. 3*, Black will want to extend to 1 as soon as he can. However, White 2, taking away Black's eye shape, is a severe threat.




Dia. 10: painful for Black

Dia. 10. Black can live with 1 to 7, as White has to defend at 8. However, making White so strong before securing a second eye in gote with 9 and 11 is painful.

Dia. 11. Because of this, Black thought up the clamp of 5, challenging White to a ko fight. Black has the adjacent ko threat of 9, so he can extricate himself from the crisis. White has no ko threats.




Dia. 11: emergency measure




*Dia. 12: not a ko threat
5: ko*

Dia. 12. Quite often in a ko fight White can connect once at 3, which may tempt him to block at 1, but this is a mistake. Black has the exquisite counter of 6, which acts as a ko threat.




Dia. 13: an equal fight

Dia. 13. Therefore, White continues after *Dia. 11* by finishing off the ko with 1. After Black 2, he pokes his head out with 3 or 'a', leading to a fight with the black groups on the side and at the bottom. This sequence has appeared in a number of professional games.



Dia. 14: a good fight for White


Dia. 14. In one professional game, Black attacked at the bottom with 1. How to evaluate this move? After all, White can link up at any time with 'a'. I can't see Black doing well in this fight.



Dia. 15: Kobayashi Koichi's new move

Dia. 15. Does that mean that *Dia. 3* is good for White? That's the question, and the answer given by my teacher, Kobayashi Koichi, was the new move of Black 1 [instead of 1 in *Dia. 9*]. Actually this move had been discussed in study groups, but the first one to play it in an actual game was Kobayashi.

Black 1 makes an empty triangle, so it was not well received at first. However, if played at this stage, White can't give way with 2. Since Black can fall back on living on the side, starting a fight with 3 and 5 would be feasible.




Dia. 16: Black lives easily

Dia. 16. That means that White has no choice but to block at 2. Black can now extend to 3, as 4 and 5 are miai for living in the corner. White is left with a cutting point at 'a'. This is a rapid development for Black.


Dia. 17. Let's compare the result when Black simply lives with 1 here with the previous diagram. If we assume that White extends at 2, there are no cutting points in his shape, so he can invade at 'a' or extend along the bottom after 5.

Dia. 18. In some cases, Black might extend


more widely at 3. However, White can then choose between invading at 4 and extending from the top to 'a'. Even so, White 2 is a little slack. At least, that's how it feels to professionals.



Dia. 17: good shape for White




Dia. 18: slack




Dia. 19: better?

Dia. 19. Let's look at another variation. If White rams into Black with 2, White 'a' later will be sente. However, Black gets the sente peep at 'b', which makes looking after his group on the side a little easier.

Dia. 20. When Black plays 1, a professional will want to pincer at 2. However, in this shape, White has to worry about the hane of Black 3, just as in *Dia. 7*. If Black plays 7 to stop White from linking up on the side, White 8 to Black 11 give what looks like an equal result. Instead of Black 7 —



Dia. 20: equal




Dia. 21: a strong attack


Dia. 21. Attaching at 1 here looks good. White can link up with 2, but Black 7 is sente, so Black can launch a severe attack against the white group at the bottom. This result is good for Black. It would seem that the narrow pincer (the marked white stone) is dubious.

Dia. 22. Pressing at 2 helps mitigate the severity of Black 'a', but the drawback of 2 is its high position. Black can aim at 3 or 'b', so this is slack territorially.

The conclusion is that invading on the 3-3 point is an effective strategy in Pattern One (page 94).




Dia. 22: slack




Pattern Two

Pattern Two. In Pattern One, my teacher's new move was quite effective, despite its strange shape. I'd like to look at some more examples from actual play. The solid connection of 5 is Pattern Two. One would normally want to fill in a liberty like this, but actually it diverges from joseki.

Dia. 1. In response, descending at 2 is the only move. If Black 3, White 4 is sente. Black is left with the peep of 'a', but White 6 and 8 are also probably sente, so White's eye shape at the bottom is a big improvement on *Dia. 19*.




Dia. 1: good for White



Dia. 2: bad for White


Dia. 2. If White simply plays 2, Black lives with 3 and 5. Before, the marked black stone was too close to White's thickness, but now it would be more appropriate to consider it a peep that is a forcing move. White will be far from satisfied with this result.

Dia. 3. After Pattern Two, living with 1 and 3 is probably the most reasonable continuation. White 4 is a sacrifice to take sente. Up to 8, White builds a solid wall of thickness. He can stake out a large-scale position with 10, so the game looks promising for him.




Dia. 3: promising for White

Dia. 4. What about answering 4 with 5? Black is presumably aiming at cutting at 6. However, connecting at 6 makes White strong, while Black's territory is extremely small. Even if he extends to 7, this result is good for White.



Dia. 4: good for White




Dia. 5: slightly inferior

Dia. 5. The reason why White doesn't play 2 and 4 is that White 8 or 'a' won't be sente. If White omits 2, simply descending at 4, they are sente. This is a major difference.


Pattern Three. I'd like to conclude by looking at the hane + attachment pattern.

Dia. 1. I mentioned earlier (*Dia. 1*, page 93) that this is a peaceful variation, but hinted that White could resist more strongly.


Dia. 2. White can resist with the hane of 1.



Pattern Three




Dia. 1: peaceful




Dia. 2: resistance

Dia. 3. White can't resist with the high approach move, as explained earlier (Dia. 3, page 93), but it's possible with the low approach move. He can escape after both ataris with 2 and 4; the sequence to 11 is inevitable.



Dia. 3: one-way street



Dia. 4: White is thick

Dia. 4. White's next move is the turning point. White 1 and 3 were the first version of this joseki, leading to the continuation to 13. You have to admit that at an early stage of the opening White has already built a lot of thickness.


Dia. 5. In Dia. 4, Black has no chance of finding happiness. This thought gives birth to the new move of Black 4. With this change in the sequence, capturing at 15 becomes the proper move, so Black gets to pull his stone out with 16. This fight looks feasible for Black.

Dia. 6. It's White turn to do a bit of thinking. How about simply jumping to 1?


Dia. 7. Black in turn improvises and comes up with the attachment of 2. After 6, this reverts to Dia. 5.

Dia. 8. Note that things are different if White has the marked stone in place. No problems arise


now for White when he plays 1. Black can't play the atari of 4 in Dia. 5, so White keeps sente.




Dia. 5: better for Black




Dia. 6: revision



Dia. 7: good for Black




Dia. 8: good for White



Dia. 9: unreasonable


Dia. 9. Countering at 2 is now unreasonable. In Dia. 7, Black was relying upon the tesuji of 6, but it is foiled by the marked stone, so White can descend at 3.




Dia. 10: Internet innovation

Dia. 10. Nowadays a lot of international go is played on the Net. In one Net game, the new move of 3 was unveiled. This was quite a surprise.

Dia. 11. Black 6 is a submissive answer. Even if Black flees at 'a' after 13, White has much better eye shape at the bottom than before.




Dia. 11: submissive



Dia. 12: strongest

Dia. 12. Black 6 here is the strongest move. After 13—




Dia. 13: White is ready for a fight

Dia. 13. If Black blocks at 1, White makes a ponnuki with 2 and 4. White's strong point is that he is left with a ko at 'a'. Will Black have enough spirit to flee with 'b' and attack the bottom white group?


Dia. 14. Connecting at 1 is the proper move. Problems arise, however, when White challenges Black to a ko fight with 2. If Black fights the ko now, White has three ko threats on the side, starting with 4. Having to play the ko threat of 7 is very painful. If he ignores 22, Black wins the ko, but this result is good for White.

Dia. 15. Consequently, when White plays 2,


Black would like to force with 3 and 5. If White answers at 6, playing the ko threat of 7 in *Dia. 14* is easier for Black. But what if White plays 6 at 'a'? Does that mean playing 5 is a luxury?



Dia. 14: good for White
ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21



Dia. 15: OK for Black



Dia. 16: no conclusion

Dia. 16. However, White 2 is a splendid move. Even if White plays 2 at 'a', there is still aji left in the corner, so this pattern is beyond me. We'll have to wait for experimentation in actual play. My conclusion is that there is no conclusion: the joseki is still evolving.

(From a supplement to *Kido*, July 1999. Translated by John Power.)

Special Sale Celebrating the Publication of the Hundredth Issue of *Go World*

Go World has reached an important milestone with the publication of this issue. To celebrate this event and to show our appreciation to our readers, who have made this achievement possible, Kiseido Publishing Company is running a special sale. From February 20 to April 30, 2004, we are offering a 10% discount with free postage on all English-language go books advertised on the Kiseido web site at http://www.kiseido.com/go_books.htm.

We are also offering a 15% discount and free shipping for all shell and slate stones advertised on our web site at http://www.kiseido.com/go_equipment.htm.

In addition, we have a limited supply of fine kaya table boards (code number B214 on our web site at http://www.kiseido.com/go_equipment.htm) that we are offering for \$900, including airmail shipping from Japan to any part of the world. These are top-of-the-line boards that normally sell for \$1,600.



To order online, go to one of the above pages on our web site and select the items you wish to purchase. Fill out the order form, and send it to us by clicking the appropriate button. You may also order by FAX (+81-467-57-5814) or by e-mail (kiseido@yk.rim.or.jp). All orders made through our web site, e-mail, or FAX will receive these discounts during the period of the sale.

Kiseido Publishing Company
CPO Box 1140, Tokyo, Japan
FAX +81-467-57-5814; email: kiseido@yk.rim.or.jp
<http://www.kiseido.com/>

